Overconfidence is universal? Depends what you mean

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Overconfidence is often assumed to be a human universal, but there remains a dearth of data systematically measuring overconfidence across populations and contexts. Moreover, cross-cultural experiments often fail to distinguish between placement and precision and worse still, often compare population-mean placement estimates rather than individual performance subtracted from placement. Here we introduce a new method for concurrently capturing both placement and precision at an individual level based on individual performance: The Elicitation of Genuine Overconfidence (EGO) method. We conducted experiments using the EGO method, manipulating domain, task knowledge, and incentives across four populations—Japanese, Hong Kong Chinese, Euro Canadians, and East Asian Canadians. We find that previous measures of population-level overconfidence may have been misleading; rather than universal, overconfidence is highly context dependent. These findings have implications for our understanding of the adaptive value of overconfidence and its role in explaining population-level and individual-level differences in economic and psychological behavior.

*Keywords:* overconfidence; self-enhancement; cultural psychology
Overconfidence is universal? Depends what you mean

Overconfidence has been described as “one of the most consistent, powerful and widespread [psychological biases]” (Johnson & Fowler, 2011), with “no problem… more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic” (Plous, 1993). Overconfident CEOs make poorer investment and merger decisions (Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008), overconfident traders increase trade volume and lead markets to underreact to relevant information and overreact to anecdotal information (Odean, 1998), overconfident leaders are more likely to go to war even when the odds are stacked against them (Johnson, 2009), and overconfident people are more likely to start a business, even though most businesses fail (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). On the other hand, overconfident people take on more ambitious projects, persist in the face of adversity (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002), and have better mental and physical health (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000). Regardless of whether overconfidence has a net benefit or cost, the common assumption underlying all these claims is that overconfidence is universal.

Illustrating this assumption, Johnson and Fowler (2011) published a model of the evolution of overconfidence. Despite the fact that two equilibria emerged under most conditions in the model—for either underconfidence or overconfidence, depending on the ratio of benefits to costs—Johnson and Fowler speculated that humans may have faced a sufficiently high benefit to cost ratio over the course of human history, such that overconfidence has become a genetic predisposition.

Researchers in the psychological and the economic sciences have been studying overconfidence somewhat independently, often not citing work in the others’ discipline. In psychology, research on the cognitive biases underlying overconfidence goes back to at least the
early 1960s (Adams & Adams, 1961), continuing through the work of researchers such as Frank Yates and George Wright (Wright et al., 1978; Yates, Lee, & Bush, 1997; Yates, Lee, Shinotsuka, Patalano, & Sieck, 1998; Yates et al., 1989). A separate but overlapping body of psychological research focused on the motivational aspects of overconfidence. This motivational bias, referred to as *self-enhancement* – the bias toward viewing the self positively – has its roots in early research on the self and self-esteem (Greenwald, 1980; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Taylor & Brown, 1988). More recently, economists have been drawing on and extending the early psychological work on the cognitive biases underlying overconfidence, but have largely ignored this parallel research on self-enhancement and motivational biases underlying overconfidence. Rather than universal, the broad body of research on this topic suggests that overconfidence is highly variable, varying by age (Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2012), gender (Barber & Odean, 2001; Beyer & Bowden, 1997; Chuang & Wang, 2005; Lenney, 1977; Lundeberg, Fox, & Punčcohař, 1994; Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2012), population (Heine & Hamamura, 2007; Heine et al., 1999; Svenson, 1981; Whitcomb, Önkal, Curley, & George Benson, 1995; Wright et al., 1978; Yates et al., 1997; Yates et al., 1998; Yates et al., 1989), domain content (Beyer & Bowden, 1997; Dunning, 1995; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Lundeberg et al., 1994), and domain context (Lenney, 1977; Yamagishi et al., 2012), sometimes disappearing altogether or being replaced by underconfidence (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Heine, 2005; Heine & Hamamura, 2007) and with interactions across several of these predictors.

For population differences, much research has suggested that East Asian populations are far less overconfident than Westerners, and sometimes even demonstrate striking underconfidence or self-criticism as opposed to self-enhancement (Heine, Takata, & Lehman,
2000; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). Moreover, these population differences have also been identified using measures that have employed hidden behavioral measures, or measure the overly positive assessments indirectly, indicating that the population difference is not merely the product of self-presentation motives (Falk & Heine, 2014; Heine et al., 2000). In sum, the universality of overconfidence is difficult to assess, given that its magnitude appears so differently across studies.

Part of the difficulty in interpreting these results is that although researchers regularly use the term “overconfidence”, they often mean very different things. Moore and Healy (2008) provide a useful set of definitions for different overconfidence concepts:

1) **Overestimation** is the belief that you are better than you really are compared to an objective standard (e.g., believing you can consistently perform a flawless parallel park, when in reality you get it right 3 times out of 10).

2) **Overplacement** is the belief that you are better than more people than you really are (e.g., most drivers believe they are better than average, so statistically at least some of these drivers must have overplacement).

3) Finally, **overprecision** is having more confidence in your beliefs than is justified (e.g., being 90% certain that you’re a better driver than average when you don’t have enough data to ascribe that level of certainty).

Each of these forms of overconfidence may be driven by both motivational factors (such as wanting to view yourself positively; e.g. Hamamura, Heine, & Takemoto, 2007; Taylor & Brown, 1988) and cognitive factors (such as the availability bias or an inability to represent distributions; e.g. Klar & Giladi, 1997; Miller & Ross, 1975). The term *self-enhancement*, which generally refers to the motivation to view oneself positively rather than negatively, particularly
compared to other people (Heine et al., 1999), may underlie overestimation and overplacement (but likely not overprecision, given that the self-enhancement literature has largely focused on how positively people compare themselves to others and not on the confidence that they have in the precision of their evaluations).

Although different definitions, and sometimes equivocation, may help explain some of the diverse results found in the literature, a related and equally challenging issue is that the same concepts may be operationalized in very different ways. Measuring overconfidence can be difficult and many researchers choose to use aggregate comparisons to judge overconfidence. For example, in the classic Better than Average effect, researchers claim high overconfidence when “93% of drivers claim to be above average”. But of course, many of those who claim to be better than average may actually be better than average, and conversely these results may hide some underconfidence, where those who are truly better than average claim less confidence than those who are worse than average (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Further, people don’t really seem to be able to conjure up what “average” means in the first place (Klar & Giladi, 1997).

Despite these difficulties, the broader literature presents the intriguing possibility that overconfidence may vary across populations, perhaps due to the differential costs and benefits created by the specific physical and social environments (Johnson & Fowler, 2011). Many factors can create psychological differences between populations (Chudek, Muthukrishna, & Henrich, in press; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010a, 2010b) and these factors may moderate many of the predictors of overconfidence. For example, in competition, a fomenter of overconfidence, gender differences in choosing to compete were opposite between patrilineal and matrilineal social structures (women in matrilineal societies were more competitive than men; Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009). If populations do systematically vary in overconfidence,
this may help explain differences in innovation rates (Shane, Venkataraman, & MacMillan, 1995). From a different angle, even when overconfidence is costly for the individual, whose business is likely to fail, it may be beneficial for the society, since the businesses that do succeed give the society a competitive advantage against other societies, allowing overconfidence (or underconfidence) to evolve via cultural evolution driven by intergroup competition.

In the present set of studies, we attempted to test several theoretical and empirical claims and bring some order to the literature using specific and precise operationalizations of overconfidence. To do this, we developed a new method for capturing both placement and precision: The Elicitation of Genuine Overconfidence (EGO) method. We ran large, cross-cultural studies in Japan, Hong Kong, and Canada, using the EGO method and also measured several variables which have been previously found to predict overconfidence. The EGO method allowed us to compare people’s self-assessments to their actual performance under conditions where they were or were not incentivized for accuracy. The EGO method was used in both concrete (math) and ambiguous (empathy) tasks, and we measured judgments both before and after participants completed the tasks. We will refer to the operationalization of overplacement as overconfidence, from herein, and distinguish Overconfidence as traditionally measured—predicted placement above the population mean, from True Overconfidence—predicted placement above actual placement. We will use capital letters, as in the previous sentence, to distinguish these specific operationalizations from the more general usage of the term overconfidence. We will refer to the operationalization of overprecision as Uncertainty in Placement. We focus on uncertainty rather than certainty, because we have no way of measuring what accurate precision would be to know if someone is overprecise. Instead, we measure
relative uncertainty from completely certain to completely uncertain. These concepts and their corresponding operationalizations are summarized in Box 1.

[INSERT BOX 1]

Our methods allowed us to test for population-level variation in these concepts, as well as study the effects of: (1) financial incentives (money vs. tokens), (2) type of task (math vs. empathy) and (3) updating based on perceived performance (before vs. after tasks) across all our populations. Our approach is also motivated by the Johnson-Fowler model. An individual’s decision to compete with others (e.g., by starting a business) is motivated by both their belief in placement and uncertainty about this belief. For example, someone with high overconfidence and low uncertainty is more likely to start a business (an entrepreneur) than someone high in both overconfidence and uncertainty (a “wantrepreneur”), who may not risk as much. On the other hand, someone low in overconfidence and low uncertainty would almost certainly not start a business (salaried worker), but someone low in overconfidence, but high in uncertainty may seek out more information to reduce their uncertainty before making the decision, or may not risk as much.

Our operationalizations are novel and arguably closer to their underlying concepts than previous work. However, we have included the more commonly used operationalizations so as to compare our findings to this previous research. To the degree that our operationalizations concord with the operationalizations used in earlier work, we can use previous findings to guide our expectations. Earlier work suggests that European Canadians/Americans would show higher overconfidence compared to our Japanese sample and Chinese sample (Heine & Hamamura, 2007), but higher uncertainty than the Chinese sample (Yates et al., 1998), which we expected to replicate here. We expected that participants would show less overconfidence after taking the test
(Lenney, 1977) and more overconfidence for the more uncertain and ambiguous task (empathy) compared to the more concrete task (math) (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). We expected that incentives would increase the motivation for accuracy at the expense of motivations to feel positive about the self, motivations for self-presentation, or motivations for self-improvement. The few incentivized past results have suggested that Chinese were unaffected by incentives and Americans became more overconfident (Yates et al., 1997) or were unaffected (Williams & Gilovich, 2008) and that Japanese men and both Japanese and American women became overconfident, but American men were unaffected (Yamagishi et al., 2012). However, these were single studies with very different operationalizations, and in the case of Yamagishi et al. (2012), population-level aggregates were used in one study, and in the other study the incentivized measurements were taken 8 months later, making it difficult to disentangle temporal changes from the effect of incentives and compare it to the present study. Past research with behavioral and indirect measures of overconfidence largely replicates the population differences found in explicit self-report measures (for a review see Falk & Heine, 2014). Finally, based on past work, we expected that males (Barber & Odean, 2001; Beyer & Bowden, 1997; Chuang & Wang, 2005; Lenney, 1977; Lundeberg et al., 1994; Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2012) would show more overconfidence, as would older people (Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2012). We had fewer expectations about Uncertainty in Placement, since it is less commonly measured.

Our findings reveal that, rather than universal, levels of overconfidence and uncertainty vary considerably by task, population, feedback from taking the test, incentives, and gender, with interactions between these variables. In some cases, results differ depending on whether Overconfidence or True Overconfidence is measured, highlighting the importance of not using aggregate-level measures.
Method

Undergraduate students at the University of Hokkaido, Japan, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the University of British Columbia in Canada predicted their performance relative to other participants at their university. We compared these predictions to their actual performance (as well as to the 50th percentile, to compare with past research). Participants took two tests: a math test, which past research indicates higher self-knowledge and where performance should be less ambiguous due to familiarity and feedback through the educational system (Freund & Kasten, 2012), and an empathy test, for which they should have less self-knowledge and where performance should be more ambiguous. Participants made predictions for their relative performance before and after taking the tests. In addition, participants were also randomly assigned to either be incentivized (using coins) or not incentivized (using tokens) for the accuracy of placement estimates. Participants estimated their relative placement using the Elicitation of Genuine Overconfidence (EGO) procedure. The EGO procedure involved distributing 10 coins or 10 tokens over 10 deciles; a more implicit method of eliciting placement than simply asking for a percentile judgment. In the incentivized condition, participants kept coins that were in the true performance decile. These methods allowed us to measure Overconfidence (based on the coin/token central tendency or point estimates compared to the average performance), True Overconfidence (based on the coin/token central tendency or point estimates compared to actual performance) and Uncertainty in Placement (based on the coin/token spread).

Procedure

1 The EGO procedure can be performed with pen and paper, but we have made EGO software available on (lead author)’s website.
All instructions were provided using a standardized script to ensure that all participants received the same information in the same way. We translated the Chinese and Japanese scripts from the English scripts using a back-translation method (Brislin, 1970).

We began by collecting 20 pilot participants in the unincentivized (token) condition. These participants were not used in our analyses, but were used as a baseline to calculate payments for subsequent real participants. We split our Canadian sample into those of European and East Asian origin, however, these participants were told that they were competing against other participants in the experiment, which included Canadians of both ethnic backgrounds. Accordingly, we calculated performance relative to all Canadians rather than within their ethnic group, although results did not differ when performance was measured relative to co-ethnics. Our Canadian sample was prescreened for these two ethnic backgrounds to exclude other ethnicities.

All non-pilot participants were randomly assigned to either the incentivized (money) or unincentivized (token) condition. The order in which the two tests were administered (math first vs. empathy first) was also randomized, as were the questions within these computerized tests.

Participants in all conditions were informed that they would get an entry into a lottery for every answer they got correct in both tests. The winner of the lottery was paid CAD100/HKD1000/JPY10,000. Participants in the money condition were further incentivized for accuracy in their relative performance on the tests. Participants in each country were given 10 coins of roughly comparable value (i.e. 10 CAD1/HKD10/JPY100 coins). To win this money, participants could place their 10 coins in any way they wanted across the 10 deciles (see Figure 1). They performed this task with 10 coins both before and after each test and were told that they would be paid the money in the decile that matched their relative performance for 1 of these 4
occasions (before vs after for math vs empathy). By randomly paying for only 1 of these 4 occasions, participants were incentivized to maximize payoffs on all occasions, without “wealth effects”, where participants behaved differently later in the experiment based on their estimates of how much they had already won, reducing incentives. At the end of the study, participants drew a number from a box, which corresponded to 1 of these 4 times a placement estimate was made. So in the case of the example in Figure 1, this participant would win $4 if their performance was actually in the 60-69 decile, $2 if it was in either the 50-59 or 70-79 deciles, $1 if it was in either the 40-49 or 80-89 deciles, and zero if their performance was less than the 40-49 decile or in the 90-99 decile. This incentive for accuracy in placement was in addition to the incentive for performing well on the tests. For the purposes of paying participants, relative performance was calculated using the data from all prior participants, including the pilot group. For the purposes of analysis, relative performance was calculated on the complete sample of non-pilot data after exclusions. Participants were thus incentivized to perform as well as possible in the two tests in both the money and token conditions, and were incentivized to give an accurate estimate of their relative performance in the money condition. In the token condition, coins were replaced with 10 tokens and no mention was made about winning money in this way. The EGO method allowed us to measure both (1) how participants believed they compared to their peers (an index of overplacement) and (2) how confident they were in this belief (an index of uncertainty), by looking at the mean and standard deviation of the decile distribution, respectively.

Since the decile measure was novel, participants were trained using a cardboard decile grid and 10 real coins or tokens. After training participants were asked questions, which they had to get correct to continue. These included: (1) who are you competing with? (2) What is a decile?
And (3) How can you win money? If the participant got any of these questions wrong, the relevant part of the script was re-read and the questions were asked again.

[INSERT FIGURE 1]

When participants began the experiment, the instructions were re-iterated and then a further training test was administered to check that participants knew how much they could win in the money condition in different situations. In both the explanation by the experimenter and this additional training, examples were balanced (i.e., both an example of a high mean and an example of a low mean; both an example of low uncertainty and an example of high uncertainty), to ensure that the instructions did not influence participant behavior in any particular direction. Participants then indicated their placement using the EGO method before taking the first test.

The math test consisted of 30 multiple choice word problems taken from the quantitative section of practice Graduate Record Examinations (GREs), presented in a random order. Participants were given 20 minutes to complete this task. The empathy test consisted of the 72 questions comprised of the 36 question “Revised Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), which had European eyes, and the 36 question Asian (Japanese) eyes version of this test (Adams Jr et al., 2010). Questions were presented in random order. Thus, all participants judged the eyes of both their own-race and the other race (at least at the coarse level of European vs. Asian eyes). The empathy test was untimed.

After the first test and corresponding placement estimates, participants were given several measures. They were given two measures that have reliably distinguished East Asian and Western samples in past research in terms of their self-enhancement: the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
scale (Rosenberg, 1965), which assesses overall positivity of the self-concept, and the False Uniqueness Task (Campbell, 1986), which assesses how people evaluate their placement compared to their same-sex peers from their university, in terms of 10 abstract traits. These two tasks will allow us to compare how the present samples compare with those used in previous studies. Participants also completed the Big 5 Personality Inventory (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008) and the Prestige and Dominance scale (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010). Participants then took the second test with corresponding placement measurements, after which they completed further measures: the Self-Construal scale (Singelis, 1994), and several demographic questions. In the Canadian sample, made up of two subsamples, the demographic questions included measures of length of time in Canada and acculturation (Identity Fusion Scale; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Vancouver Index of Acculturation; Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000).

Participants were then debriefed and those in the money condition were paid. The winners of the CAD100, HKD1000, and JPY10,000 were paid after data collection was completed.

Participants

The sample consists of undergraduate students at the University of Hokkaido, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the University of British Columbia. The Canadian sample was further divided into those who were of European or East Asian ancestry. All data herein refers to non-pilot data (i.e. those collected after the first 20 from each university). Participants were excluded for one of three reasons: (1) Technical errors, when data wasn’t saved or the participant accidentally started the tests without receiving instructions; (2) Failed vigilance
checks, when participants failed to correctly answer a vigilance check question such as “Please click ‘Not at all’”; and (3) Exploiting the system, defined as putting all their money in the lowest decile and then performing at levels significantly below chance. Incentivizing performance on the two tests (independent of accurate performance predictions) was expected to prevent participants from exploiting the game in this way and this was true for all but 4 participants. Table 1 reports the total data collected, all exclusions, and age and gender information. Canadian exclusions are reported together as technical issues prevented us from determining ethnicity in some cases.

[INSERT TABLE 1]

Results

Comparability of Present Samples to Past Samples of Self-Enhancement Measures

First, we note how our samples compared with those used in past research on self-enhancement, to discern whether our samples are unusual on relevant variables. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale and the False Uniqueness Task are routinely used in the self-enhancement literature and so we included these to give us a basis to compare our samples (insofar as exposure to our measures don’t change behavior). A meta-analysis of past research has found that Western and East Asian samples differ on these two measures with effect sizes of $d = .94$ and $d = 1.2$ (whereas Westerners differ from East Asian Americans with effect sizes of $d = .32$ and $d = .53$), for the Rosenberg and False Uniqueness Tasks, respectively (Heine & Hamamura, 2007). For comparison, we regress these same measures on the dummy codes of each sample with European Canadians set as the reference group. We report the beta coefficients in Table 2 below.

[INSERT TABLE 2]
Our East Asian Canadian population are more self-enhancing than is typically measured and are mostly indistinguishable from the European Canadians. The Hong Kong Chinese are somewhere in-between typical self-esteem measures for East Asian Americans and East Asians compared to Westerners, but in the same direction, but are higher on False Uniqueness, a reversal of past results. The Japanese have self-esteem and false uniqueness results in the same direction, and of roughly the same magnitude. These results make it difficult to compare our East Asian Canadian and Hong Kong Chinese sample to previous self-enhancement results, but our Japanese sample is quite similar to past samples, increasing our confidence in the generalizability of those findings. In the next section, we correlate all of our different measures of self-enhancement overconfidence, and uncertainty in placement.

**Correlation between Self-Enhancement And Overconfidence**

Here we correlate self-esteem, false uniqueness, Overconfidence, True Overconfidence, and Uncertainty in Placement. Our power is increased beyond our sample size for some measures by having multiple measures from each participant, but the size and direction of these correlations are informative. These correlations are reported in Table 3 below and are reported separately for each sample in the supplementary.

[INSERT TABLE 3]

These results reveal small correlations between false uniqueness and self-esteem, between self-esteem and Overconfidence, and between false uniqueness and Overconfidence and to a lesser extent, false uniqueness and True Overconfidence. Overconfidence and True Overconfidence are moderately correlated with Overconfidence showing a small negative
correlation with uncertainty in placement (i.e. lower uncertainty is associated with higher confidence). This indicates two important things. First, our measures of overconfidence and uncertainty in placement reveal only a weak relationship with standard measures used for self-enhancement, and our measures of uncertainty in placement and overconfidence are largely independent constructs. In the next section we discuss our main approach to analyzing these data.

Analysis of primary measures

Here we present our strategy for analyzing how our key predictors—task type (math vs. empathy), incentives (money vs. tokens), feedback (before vs. after), and population (European Canadian, East Asian Canadian, Hong Kong Chinese, and Japanese)—affect Overconfidence, True Overconfidence, and Uncertainty in Placement. We also calculated a “reward for accuracy”—which assesses how effective the combinations of True Overconfidence and Uncertainty in Placement were in generating payoffs.

Predicted placement was defined as the mean of the distribution of coins or tokens in deciles. Overconfidence, consistent with past operationalizations, is 50% subtracted from this mean placement estimate. In contrast, True Overconfidence, is the actual individual relative performance placement, subtracted from this mean placement estimate. By these measures 0 would indicate no bias, a negative value indicates an underconfident bias, and a positive value an overconfident bias. We operationalize Uncertainty in Placement as the standard deviation of the decile spread. Higher values of the decile spread indicate more uncertainty.²

² Immediately after participants made their decile estimates, we asked them what percentile they thought they would score in, how certain they were that this was the percentile that they would score in, and, then for a comparable decile measure, how certain they were that they would score 5% on either side of this percentile. We used the percentile estimate (which was not incentivized) to calculate a True Percentile Overconfidence by subtracting the participant’s percentile based on performance. The correlation between True Overconfidence and True Percentile Overconfidence was large and significant (range from .94 to .97 within each sample). The correlation between Uncertainty in Placement and the point estimate equivalent were in the right direction, but much
To analyze the effect of our manipulations, we regressed Overconfidence, True Overconfidence and Uncertainty in Placement on our key predictors – task type (math vs. empathy), incentives (money vs. tokens), and feedback (before vs. after) using an OLS regression, looking at each population separately. We use clustered robust standard errors to control for the common variance associated with each participant providing us with 4 data points (before and after the two tasks).

The intercepts of these regressions tell us the overconfidence and uncertainty when our predictors are 0. Based on our coding, this is the unincentivized empathy test before feedback. The regression coefficient of each predictor tells us how the predictor increases or decreases overconfidence compared to this baseline condition.

We select unincentivized empathy before feedback as the baseline since this most closely resembles the conditions in which overconfidence or self-enhancement has been measured in the past—an ambiguous task, without incentives for accuracy, and without immediate feedback. From this starting point, we will then gradually add layers of complexity as we examine the effect of feedback, task type, and incentives in four different populations. Finally, we discuss gender effects. We repeat this process for uncertainty in placement.

After going through these main results, we calculate “reward for accuracy”—how the strategies found in each population affected payoffs. Note that although we discuss each “layer of complexity”, these results all emerge from a single regression for each outcome.

smaller (range from -.03 to -.25; it was a significant correlation for all groups except the East Asian Canadians). This suggests that people may find it difficult to assign a probability to their uncertainty in placement. For the East Asian Canadians it was effectively uncorrelated. Since the point estimate and decile estimate of True Overconfidence were so highly correlated, and because the percentile estimate was not incentivized and is thus harder to interpret, we focus our analyses on the richer and less explicit measure of both overconfidence and uncertainty given by the decile measures.
(overconfidence, uncertainty in placement, and reward for accuracy); i.e., we are not inflating our Type I error by performing multiple comparisons.

**Overconfidence and True Overconfidence**

We begin by looking at how Overconfidence and True Overconfidence differ by task and incentives, before and after performing the task. We plot the raw means for each sample, for each cell of our design with 95% confidence intervals to allow for comparisons between means. Let’s start with our baseline condition—empathy with incentives for accurate predicted placement.

**Unincentivized Empathy**

In Figure 2 below, we plot Overconfidence—predicted performance minus 50%—and True Overconfidence—predicted performance minus true performance—for each sample before and after taking the empathy test with no incentives for accuracy in placement. By both measures of overconfidence, we find that all samples update their predictions after taking the tests, with almost identical slopes towards less confidence. By the traditional overconfidence measure (Figure 2a), all but the Japanese appear to be significantly overconfident. The Japanese also appear overconfident, but are statistically indistinguishable from unbiased estimates (0%). After taking the test, all groups update towards less confidence, such that all but the Hong Kong participants are statistically indistinguishable from accurate. However, these interpretations are misleading and reveal the danger in using population-level estimates. When we consider actual performance in the True Overconfidence measure, the order of the samples is the same, but the measures are different. Here, the Japanese are actually *underconfident* and significantly less confident than all other groups, who have a mean above zero (accurate).
We next look at how the results compare for the task that participants should have more self-knowledge about: math ability.

**Does unincentivized math differ from unincentivized empathy?**

In Figure 3 below, we plot the same two graphs, without incentives for placement accuracy, but this time for the math test, an ability for which people should have more self-knowledge. Figure 3 shows several key differences in confidence on the math test compared to the empathy test. The most obvious difference is that by both Overconfidence and True Overconfidence, the two Canadian samples have much steeper updating, going from overconfident to underconfident and significantly less than their pre-test estimates. There was essentially no difference between the behavior of the two Canadian groups on confidence in their math ability. These results might indicate that the Canadians found the math test to be much more difficult than predicted. By taking into consideration performance and measuring True Overconfidence, we find that for math, all samples are essentially identical before taking the test and statistically indistinguishable from accurate. However, after taking the test, the slope for the Hong Kong Chinese and Japanese is similar to the empathy test, but become much closer to accurate (as might be expected for a task with more self-knowledge). In contrast, the two Canadian samples swing from overconfident to underconfident and are significantly or marginally significantly less confident than the Hong Kong Chinese and Japanese after taking the test. These results suggest population-level differences in updating.
Under no incentives for accurate placement estimates, the pattern of results in the math test compared to the empathy test are largely the same, except that people are more accurate in the math test and Canadians go from slightly overconfident to slightly underconfident after taking the test. We next look at whether incentives for accuracy affect these results in both tests.

**Do incentives affect overconfidence?**

In Figure 4, we plot both the empathy and math test when participants were incentivized for accurate placement estimates. For a side-by-side comparison with the unincentivized condition, see Supplementary. Under incentives, Figure 4 reveals quite different patterns. To begin with, all groups except East Asian Canadians are significantly more overconfident when incentivized, not less as some expect. The effect of incentives ranged from 3% to 12% in these more overconfident groups (see Table 4). We find that the Japanese appear to be the least overconfident of the four groups by the Overconfidence measure in the empathy test, but the most overconfident by the True Overconfidence measure. This reversal highlights the need to consider performance and operationalize True Overconfidence and not just population-level Overconfidence. These results occur because the Japanese perform worse under incentives (see Supplemental for performance differences).

In the math test, while the combination of incentives and feedback seems to remove any bias among European Canadians, and to a lesser extent in East Asian Canadians and Hong Kong participants. The combination of money and feedback in math actually makes the Japanese more overconfident, perhaps because the Japanese found the math test easier than they expected—
Japanese performance was better than every other group and significantly so under incentives (see Supplementary).

[INSERT FIGURE 4]

We statistically explore these patterns by regressing True Overconfidence on our key predictors for each sample separately, accounting for common variance with clustered robust standard errors. We express the coefficients as percentages to indicate percentage overconfidence.

**Multiple Regression Analysis**

We used an OLS regression to understand the effects of each of our key variables of interest, regressing True Overconfidence on each variable for each population separately. Since we get 4 data points from every participant, we use clustered robust standard errors to account for the common variance, clustering scores within participants. The intercept of the regression reveals the level of True Overconfidence when all other variables are 0, i.e., True Overconfidence in the empathy test, before taking the test and without incentives. All other variables are compared to this base condition. To avoid difficult to interpret interactions between the samples and our key predictors, we instead report regressions for each sample separately.

The regression reveals that in this base condition, all but the Japanese are overconfident, with the two Canadian samples the most overconfident. The Japanese are slightly underconfident. All groups become more accurate after taking the tests and become very similar in overconfidence. The math test varies by population, with both Canadians becoming less overconfident and Hong Kong Chinese and Japanese staying largely the same. Incentives seem to increase overconfidence in all groups, but particularly so in the Japanese, who become
significantly more overconfident and reach levels of overconfidence comparable to all other groups. True Overconfidence is maximized by being a Euro-Canadian under incentives before the empathy test, whereas it’s minimized by being Japanese, not incentivized after the empathy test.

[INSERT TABLE 4]

True Overconfidence is a measure of how people’s beliefs about how they compare to others differs from reality, but people can also vary in how strongly they believe in this predicted placement. In the next section, we explore population-level differences in this “confidence in confidence”: Uncertainty in Placement.

Uncertainty in Placement

Uncertainty in Placement, captured as the standard deviation of the decile spread, aims to measure how much confidence participants had in their placement estimates. In Figure 5, we plot this standard deviation as we did for Overconfidence and True Overconfidence (a larger value indicates more uncertainty). Figure 5 reveals that Hong Kong Chinese are more uncertain than Japanese participants who are more uncertain than the European Canadians, who are in turn more uncertain than the East Asian Canadians. When money is on the line, all groups become more uncertain and this uncertainty is higher for the more ambiguous task (empathy).

[INSERT FIGURE 5]

These results are supported by a regression analysis (Table 5). In the True Overconfidence analysis, we were able to meaningfully interpret coefficients as percentages and
use our intercept to indicate the presence of overconfidence (positive) compared to accuracy (zero) or underconfidence (negative). Here, our outcome variable is less meaningful, so we conduct an OLS regression of the z-score of the standard deviation (Uncertainty in Placement) on standardized age, gender (Male = 1), task type (Math = 1), updating (After = 1), incentives (Incentive = 1), each sample compared to our Japanese sample (the group in the middle of Uncertainty in Placement). We found no significant interactions between samples and each variable and so only report main effects. We control for common variance using clustered robust standard errors, clustering on participant.

The regression reveals that older people and males are more certain. Participants are more certain about the math test compared to the empathy test and slightly more certain after taking the test. Participants spread their coins (incentives) more widely than their tokens. Finally, the Hong Kong Chinese were the least certain, significantly more than all other populations. The next least certain were the Japanese who were significantly less certain than the East Asian Canadians. The East Asian Canadians were the most certain with Euro Canadian certainty falling somewhere between the East Asian Canadians and Japanese.

[INSERT TABLE 5]

These results indicate that populations are employing different strategies under different conditions along two dimensions—placement and uncertainty in placement. Both Canadian samples took more of a “go big or go home” strategy, putting more coins or tokens in fewer deciles, while the Hong Kong Chinese and Japanese took a more risk averse strategy, and the Hong Kong Chinese particularly so when real money was on the line. In terms of effect size, the influence of monetary incentives was comparable to being from Hong Kong. Being an East Asian Canadian (relative to Japanese) is comparable to being male. In the next section we
measure how these strategies translate to payoffs in terms of how much money participants could have potentially taken home.

**Reward for accuracy**

Here we consider how potential payoffs, that is how much money participants would have taken home if or when they were paid for that condition. In reality, participants were not paid for accuracy when using tokens (unincentivized) and were paid for one of the four stages of reporting placement (before and after each task) in the incentivized condition. We refer to this potential payoff as the “reward for accuracy”.

Figure 6 reveals that despite the distinct strategies employed by different populations (e.g. “go big or go home” vs risk averse) little difference emerged in terms of payoffs. Furthermore, these payoffs were close to chance performance, indicating that participants had little in the way of accurate self-knowledge about these tasks. Perhaps surprisingly, using real money was not substantively different to using tokens, and if anything resulted in slightly lower payoffs. Unsurprisingly, participants had higher payoffs in the task in which they had more knowledge—math and were generally able to update their estimates and increase their payoffs after taking the math test. Feedback from having taken the empathy test did very little to increase payoffs. Although these differences were not significant when money was on the line, the Canadian strategy of “go big or go home” paid off marginally better for the task for which they had more knowledge—math and the Hong Kong Chinese and Japanese risk averse strategy paid off marginally better for the more uncertain task—empathy.

[INSERT FIGURE 6]
Uncertainty in Placement differs by gender, with males showing more certainty. Though genders differed in certainty, they did not differ in placement. Did this certainty pay off? For Reward for Accuracy, males had slightly higher payoffs (27 cents, \( p = .047 \); see Supplemental Tables S5 and S6) controlling for other main effects, but also significantly higher variance (\( ASD = .38, p < .001 \); i.e., more winners and losers). In the next section, we discuss gender differences more broadly.

**Gender**

Gender predicts both confidence estimates and performance. In general our results suggest that in contexts when males are more overconfident, the difference is much larger than in cases when females are more overconfident. However, females are often as confident or slightly more confident than males. So rather than males being consistently more confident than females, as is sometimes suggested by the literature, overconfidence and performance differences between the genders varies by incentives, task, and population. These results do not change the overall pattern of results so far reported.

Here we look at the difference between males and females in performance, Overconfidence, True Overconfidence, and Uncertainty in Placement within each sample for each test, with and without incentives, and for the estimates of performance, before and after each test. These patterns are complex, so we regress each outcome on gender and plot the coefficient of gender as a color ranging from red (females higher, shown by negative) to blue (males higher, shown by positive), where white indicates neither is higher. Significant differences are bolded and outlined in a darker black. Marginally significant are just bolded. We begin by looking at performance
Performance

These results in Figure 7 indicate that men and women perform differently on the different tests between populations and under incentives. On the empathy test without incentives, European Canadian women and Hong Kong Chinese women did better, but under incentives there was only a small difference with men performing a bit better. The pattern was the opposite, but not significant among East Asian Canadians and Japanese.

Men in general performed better on the math test. European Canadian men performed significantly better under incentives, but there was no gender difference without incentives. Japanese men were consistently better at math, whereas East Asian Canadians were part way between these groups – men performing better overall, but more so under incentives.

[INSERT FIGURE 7]

In assessing overconfidence, it is critical to take these performance differences into consideration, but first we’ll look at what you would find if you didn’t take these performance differences into account.

Overconfidence

The results in Figure 8 highlight that men and women behave differently, but this is mostly based on test type. Without considering performance differences, men in all populations and conditions, except East Asian Canadians before taking the math test, show more overconfidence (values above the mean) than women. For empathy, the predictions are more balanced, with Japanese women under incentives showing more overconfidence. However, since we know that performance differs, these results are only meaningful in so far as they replicate past research.

[INSERT FIGURE 8]
At least for math, these results replicate past research, suggesting that men are more overconfident than women. But these results don’t take into consideration the performance difference previously discussed. Do the results change when we consider performance?

**True Overconfidence**

When True Overconfidence is measured, as shown in Figure 9, the strong gender differences disappear. In fact, only among European Canadians are they somewhat consistent, with unincentivized men showing more overconfidence for both empathy and math. When incentivized, European Canadian women show more overconfidence. East Asian Canadian women show more overconfidence in math than East Asian Canadian men. This bias is driven by them not predicting their poorer performance. On empathy, both genders are roughly the same, but East Asian Canadian men seem to be a bit more overconfident compared to women when incentivized. Results are mixed among the Hong Kong Chinese and Japanese with only marginally or not significant results.

[INSERT FIGURE 9]

Next, we consider gender differences in Uncertainty in Placement.

**Uncertainty in Placement**

The results in Figure 10, coded so that more blue suggests males have more certainty suggest that the overall, East Asian Canadian and Hong Kong Chinese men show the most certainty. For the Japanese and European Canadians, the genders act more similarly, with a slight trend towards higher female certainty among European Canadians for the empathy test.
The Uncertainty in Placement results suggest that men are generally more certain of their beliefs, but not universally so. And of course, we have no way of knowing if this certainty is warranted. Men do have slightly higher Reward for Accuracy payoffs, suggesting that this certainty may be warranted or at least pay off.

**Discussion**

The results we present in this paper show that overconfidence is inconsistent, sometimes weak, and cross-culturally variable, rather than “consistent, powerful, and widespread” (Johnson & Fowler, 2011). These results challenge the idea that we can make broad and general claims about overconfidence. They make clear that overconfidence is highly dependent on incentives, context, available information, gender, and population. Nonetheless, the data offers some critical lessons and key findings:

1. It is crucial to distinguish between placement and precision in overconfidence. For example, though men and women can both be overconfident by placement estimates, men do appear to generally be more certain about those estimates. Similarly, though all groups appear to be overconfident by placement (at least when incentivized and prior to feedback), Hong Kong Chinese (and perhaps Japanese) show less certainty. The EGO method allows the simultaneous and implicit measurement of both placement and precision, and could easily be adapted to measure overestimation rather than overplacement.

2. It is crucial to consider individual performance measures when comparing overplacement between groups. For example, Canadians and Hong Kong Chinese
appear to be overconfident and Japanese accurate on the empathy task without incentives. However, when we consider individual performance, all populations are actually accurate and the Japanese tend towards underconfidence and are significantly less confident than other populations. Under incentives, the Japanese seem like the least confident group when you compare estimates to mean performance, but are the most confident group when you compare estimates to individual performance! This discrepancy occurs because performance also varies between conditions.

3. Overconfidence is prevalent, but not universal. In fact, by the True Overconfidence measure, of our 32 cells (Task x Incentives x Feedback x Population), 22% were underconfident.

4. Feedback through taking the test generally results in more accurate estimates. The size of the update is very similar between populations, with two exceptions in the math test. Under no incentives, both Canadian samples went from overconfident to underconfident after taking the test, perhaps because they found the test particularly difficult— they performed more poorly than the East Asian populations. Conversely, under incentives, the Japanese actually increased in overconfidence, perhaps because they found the test particularly easy—Japanese performed significantly better than all other populations.

5. Consistent with the idea that more information leads to more accurate estimates, individuals are more accurate in the task for which they should have more self-knowledge: math. We found that participants were more accurate in placement for math than empathy and more certain about this belief.
6. The effect of incentives is culturally specific. For True Overconfidence, all but the Japanese were largely unaffected by incentives and in all cases, rather than making people more accurate, incentives resulted in higher True Overconfidence.

7. The effect of incentives varies between placement and precision. When incentivized, most groups increased placement estimates, but decreased certainty about those estimates.

8. Populations differed in placement and precision, but payoffs from these distinct strategies was similar. Canadians used more of a “go big or go home” strategy, compared to the risk averse strategy employed by the Japanese and Chinese, particularly when money was involved (this finding appears to contradict the “cushion hypothesis,” which claims that East Asians are financially risk-seeking because they perceive a greater support network to rely on if they fail; Hsee & Weber, 1999). Payoffs (or potential payoffs) were largely the same between real money and tokens, and were remarkably small—rarely deviating from chance—indicating overall poor self-knowledge. However, payoffs did vary by task – participants generally made more money for math – and more so after taking the math test. Taking the empathy test had no effect on payoffs. The different population strategies made almost no difference to payoffs, although when real money was involved, the “go big or go home” strategy was marginally better for math, the higher self-knowledge task, and the more risk averse strategy, marginally better for empathy, the lower self-knowledge task. Of course, although they are roughly the same on-average, the “go big or go home” strategy will generate more variation in winning across those populations.
Our findings contrast to some prior cross-cultural and cross-gender research. That the East Asian samples showed overconfidence in the face of incentives similar to that of the European Canadian samples may seem at odds with past research finding pronounced population differences in self-enhancement using hidden behavioral and indirect measures (although we remind readers that the self-esteem and false uniqueness measures indicated that the East Asian-Canadian and Hong Kong Chinese samples were unusually self-enhancing; for reviews see Falk & Heine, 2014; Hamamura et al., 2007). One reason for the different pattern of results may be that the measures used in this study tapped into somewhat distinct processes compared with those measures used in previous studies; this notion is supported by the modest correlations between the different measures of overconfidence and self-enhancement presented in Table 3. An alternative account is that perhaps these conflicting findings indicate that East Asians adopt underconfident assessments of themselves as a strategy to motivate themselves for self-improvement, even if they are able to recognize, when incentivized to scrutinize their performance more closely, that they are being overly self-critical when doing so. People can have different motivations for assessing themselves, either to feel good about themselves, to attend to areas in need of improvement, or to accurately assess their standing (cf., Sedikides & Strube, 1997). That the Japanese and Hong Kong Chinese samples had overall greater uncertainty in placement suggests that they have weaker commitments to any single view of self. This may indicate that their various self-views are more in conflict with each other, and more dependent on circumstances, than they are for Westerners (see Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010; Sedikides & Strube, 1997).

It is commonly claimed that men are more overconfident than women (although this is not reliably found in self-enhancement studies). We argue that this conclusion may be a result of
measuring overconfidence without considering performance differences. In the stereotypically male domain of math, males appear overconfident, but only when compared to the mean (males make higher placement estimates). When True Overconfidence is calculated by subtracting actual performance, male overconfidence evaporates, because males actually perform better on-average in stereotypically male domains. Instead, both men and women are overconfident in different contexts. However, men are more certain than women. It is difficult to say whether this is “overprecision”. One indication is how this certainty translates to payoffs. Men have slightly higher payoffs than women suggesting that the certainty may not be “over” what is adaptive, but males also have greater variance in payoffs in every population, suggesting that although this certainty pays off for males overall, the spread of winners and losers is larger than for females.

In conclusion, we caution against broad generalizations about overconfidence. We present EGO data from four populations, two distinct tasks, before and after feedback, and experimental manipulation of incentives. From these data, we argue that claims of universal overconfidence do not stand up to the incredible variation in both placement and precision by domain, knowledge of the task, incentives, population, and gender. Instead, overconfidence appears to be a highly-context dependent strategy.

References


Klar, Y., & Giladi, E. E. (1997). No one in my group can be below the group's average: a robust positivity bias in favor of anonymous peers. *Journal of personality and social psychology, 73*(5), 885.


Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1977). Do those who know more also know more about how much they know? *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 20*(2), 159-183.


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Figure 1. Screenshot from the money condition in Canada before the math test. Participants could choose how to distribute their coins across the 10 deciles. This particular participant indicates a belief that their performance will be around the 65th percentile, with a tapering range that extends to just below average (40-49) to one of much above average (80-89), with a mean of 60-69.

Figure 2. Empathy (a) Overconfidence and (b) True Overconfidence without incentives for placement accuracy. By the traditional measure, all samples appear to be overconfident before
taking the test, except for the Japanese, who have an overconfident mean, but are statistically indistinguishable from accuracy. After taking the test, all samples become less overconfident, with all but the Hong Kong Chinese, statistically indistinguishable from accurate. The True Overconfidence measure tells a slightly different story – all samples are statistically indistinguishable from accurate, but the Japanese sample now appear underconfident by their mean and significantly less confident than all other samples. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Note that the y-axis range is different so as to better visualize the differences between lines.

![Graph](image)

Figure 3. Math (a) Overconfidence and (b) True Overconfidence without incentives for placement accuracy. Compared to the empathy results, before taking the tests, the four populations are much closer to each other in the size of overconfidence. After taking the test, the Japanese are accurate by both measures, but Hong Kong Chinese are accurate only by True Overconfidence, where their behavior is almost identical to the Japanese. We see a substantial drop in confidence by both measures among both Canadian groups to underconfidence and true underconfidence. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4. Empathy (a) Overconfidence and (b) True Overconfidence and Math (c) Overconfidence and (d) True Overconfidence. All with incentives for placement accuracy. The pattern we see under incentives is quite different to the pattern with no incentives. Thus far, updating toward less overconfidence after taking the test has seemed to be universal, but here we find that when it comes to math, the Japanese sample go from overconfident to even more overconfident. The importance of using True Overconfidence is underscored by the empathy results where the Japanese go from the least overconfident group to the most overconfident group. This reversal occurs due to poorer performance under incentives. For the math test, both Overconfidence and True Overconfidence largely tell the same story, although Overconfidence
suggests that European Canadians are underconfident after taking the test, which is not true when you consider actual performance. European Canadians are nonetheless the least overconfident in math when incentivized for accuracy. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Note that the y-axis range for empathy is different so as to better visualize the differences between lines.
Figure 5. Uncertainty in Placement for Empathy (a) without incentives and (b) with incentives and for Math (c) without incentives and (d) with incentives. Overall, the Hong Kong Chinese and Japanese show more uncertainty than the Canadians (controlling for demographics) and we find more uncertainty in general when incentivized. Incentives increase uncertainty and uncertainty is greater for the more uncertain task, empathy. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 6. The mean number of (a) tokens or (b) money in the correct decile. Overall people did quite poorly getting close to chance ($1) in how much money they made. The mean was not substantially higher for real money compared to tokens and was in fact generally lower when using real money. The mean was higher in the task for which participants had more self-knowledge – math and in this task, taking the math test increased returns. The European Canadians mean was particularly low for empathy in with real money. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Empathy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Math</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>East Asian</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>East Asian</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokens</td>
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<td>4%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>Tokens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Money</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Performance as a percentage difference in raw score on test between males and females. Positive values (blue) indicate that males performed better. Negative values (red) indicate that females performed better. The color ranges from -20% to 20%. Statistically significant values are bolded and surrounded by a darker border. Marginally significant values are bold.
Figure 8. Traditional overconfidence difference between males and females. Positive values and blue indicate that males had higher overconfidence. Negative values and red indicate that females had higher overconfidence. The color ranges from -30% to 30%. Statistically significant values are bolded and surrounded by a darker border. Marginally significant values are bold.

Figure 9. True Overconfidence difference between males and females. Positive values (blue) indicate that males had higher true overconfidence. Negative values (red) indicate that females had higher overconfidence. The color ranges from -30% to 30%. Statistically significant values are bolded and surrounded by a darker border. Marginally significant values are bold.

Figure 10. Uncertainty in placement difference between males and females as measured by differences in standard deviations in the decile distribution. Positive values (red) indicate that
males had higher uncertainty. Negative values (blue) indicate that females had higher uncertainty. The color ranges from -5 to 5. Statistically significant values are bolded and surrounded by a darker border. Marginally significant values are bold.

Box 1.

*Key overconfidence definitions for concepts and their corresponding operationalizations.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overplacement: Belief that you are better than more people than you really are.</td>
<td>True Overconfidence: Predicted placement minus actual placement. This is both an intuitive and correct operationalization of overplacement, but is rarely measured because it requires measuring actual performance. Overconfidence: Predicted placement minus 50%. This is the common operationalization of overconfidence, but hides individual differences in ability and performance, which may vary independently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overprecision: More confidence in your beliefs than is justified by evidence.</td>
<td>Uncertainty in Placement: The standard deviation of placement estimates,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with higher values indicating more uncertainty.

Table 1.

Demographic details for all non-pilot participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Canadian</th>
<th>East Asian Canadian</th>
<th>Hong Kong Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Collected</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded Technical</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded Vigilance</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded Exploit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Analyzed</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Mean</td>
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<td>20.43</td>
<td>20.55</td>
<td>19.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age SD</td>
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<td>4.13</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
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<td>59</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Male</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.

Standardized differences between Western population (European Canadians in our experiment) and other populations based on a meta-analysis and in our sample. Self-esteem results are largely in the same direction as the meta-analysis, although East Asian Canadians are not significantly different to European Canadians. False Uniqueness results are in the opposite direction to past results for East Asian Canadians and Hong Kong Chinese, significantly so in the latter, but comparable to past results for the Japanese.
Table 3.

Correlation between overconfidence and self-enhancement measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-esteem</th>
<th>False Uniqueness</th>
<th>Overconfidence</th>
<th>True Overconfidence</th>
<th>Uncertainty in Placement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Self-esteem</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False Uniqueness</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overconfidence</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True Overconfidence</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty in Placement</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05

Table 4.

OLS regression of True Overconfidence on the binary variables for task type (Math), updating (After) and incentives (Incentive). The intercept here is meaningful and tells us the level of true overconfidence when all other variables are 0, i.e. true overconfidence in empathy, before taking the test, without incentives for accuracy. We control for common variance using clustered robust standard errors clustering on participant.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>After</th>
<th>Incentive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-6.78 [-8.87, -4.69]***</td>
<td>3.17 [-7.68, 14.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-8.07 [-10.09, -6.05]***</td>
<td>0.18 [-10.40, -10.03]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-4.28 [-6.00, 2.57]***</td>
<td>3.80 [-3.31, 10.92]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.98 [-4.09, -8.07]***</td>
<td>11.42 [2.55, 20.30]***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>P</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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<td>.001</td>
</tr>
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<td>Math</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incentive</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Hong Kong Chinese</td>
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<td>Japanese</td>
<td>[.18, .42]</td>
<td>.150</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.

**OLS regression of standardized standard deviation of decile estimates on age, gender, task type, updating, incentives, and dummy-coded samples compared to the Euro Canadians. We control for common variance using clustered robust standard errors clustering on participant.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>[.10, 1.29]</td>
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<tr>
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*p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001