%0 Journal Article %J NBER %D Working Paper %T Zero-Sum Thinking, the Evolution of Effort-Suppressing Beliefs, and Economic Development %A Jean-Paul Carvalho %A Augustin Bergeron %A Henrich, Joseph %A Nathan Nunn %A Jonathan L. Weigel %B NBER %G eng %U https://www.nber.org/papers/w31663 %0 Journal Article %D Working Paper %T Which Humans? %A Mohammad Atari %A Mona J. Xue %A Peter S. Park %A Damián E. Blasi %A Henrich, Joseph %G eng %U https://psyarxiv.com/5b26t %0 Journal Article %D Working Paper %T Surname Diversity, Social Ties and Innovation %A Max Posch %A Jonathan Schulz %A Henrich, Joseph %G eng %U https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4531209 %0 Journal Article %D Working Paper %T Kin-based institutions and economic development %A Duman Bahrami-Rad %A Jonathan Beauchamp %A Henrich, Joseph %A Jonathan Schulz %G eng %U https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4200629 %0 Journal Article %J Psychological Bulletin %D Forthcoming %T Beyond Newton: Why Assumptions of Universality are Critical to Cognitive Science, and How to Finally Move Past Them %A Ivan Kroupin %A Davis, Helen E. %A Henrich, Joseph %B Psychological Bulletin %G eng %U https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/a4qx3 %0 Book Section %B One Hundred Years of Game Theory: A Nobel Symposium %D Forthcoming %T Game Theory in Cultural Evolution %A Henrich, Joseph %E Mark Voorneveld et al. %B One Hundred Years of Game Theory: A Nobel Symposium %I Cambridge University Press %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Current Anthropology %D Forthcoming %T Magic and empiricism in early Chinese rainmaking %A Hong, Ze %A Slingerland, Edward %A Henrich, Joseph %B Current Anthropology %G eng %0 Book %D 2024 %T The Evolution of Religion and Morality: Volume II %E Lang, Martin %E Purzycki, B. G %E Henrich, J. %E Norenzayan, A. %I Taylor & Francis. %G eng %U https://www.routledge.com/The-Evolution-of-Religion-and-Morality-Volume-II/Lang-Purzycki-Henrich-Norenzayan/p/book/9781032624075 %0 Book %D 2024 %T The Evolution of Religion and Morality: Volume I %E Purzycki, B. G %E Henrich, J. %E Norenzayan, A. %I Taylor & Francis. %G eng %U https://www.routledge.com/The-Evolution-of-Religion-and-Morality-Volume-I/Purzycki-Henrich-Norenzayan/p/book/9781032624037 %0 Journal Article %J Cell %D 2024 %T Microbial transmission in the social microbiome and host health and disease %A A. Sarkar %A McInroy, C. J. A. %A Harty, S. %A Raulo, A. %A Ibata, N. G. O. %A Valles-Colomer, M. %A Johnson K. V.-A. %A Brito, I. L. %A Henrich, J. %A Archie, E. A. %A Barreiro, L. B. %A Gazzaniga, F. S. %A Finlay, B. B. %A Koonin, E. V. %A Carmody, R. N. %A Moeller, A. H. %B Cell %V 187 %P 17-43. %8 4 Jan, 2024 %G eng %U https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0092867423013466 %0 Journal Article %J Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science %D 2024 %T The Moderating Role of Culture in the Generalizability of Psychological Phenomena %A Robin Schimmelpfennig %A Spicer, Rachel %A Cindel J. M. White %A Gervais, Will %A Norenzayan, Ara %A Steven Heine %A Henrich, Joseph %A Muthukrishna, Michael %B Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science %V 7 %G eng %U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/25152459231225163 %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Nature Human Behavior %D 2023 %T Machine culture %A Brinkmann, L. %A Baumann, F. %A Bonnefon, J. %A Derex, M. %A Müller, T. F. %A Nussberger, A. %A Czaplicka, A. %A Acerbi, A. %A Griffiths, T. L. %A Henrich, Joseph %A Joel Z. Leibo %A McElreath, Richard %A Pierre-Yves Oudeyer %A Jonathan Stray %A Rahwan, Iyad %B Nature Human Behavior %G eng %U https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-023-01742-2 %0 Journal Article %J American Anthropologist %D 2023 %T Evolving payoff currencies through the construction of causal theories %A Hong, Ze %A Henrich, Joseph %B American Anthropologist %G eng %U https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aman.13926 %0 Journal Article %J Zygon %D 2023 %T Introduction To Symposium On “Just How Special Are Humans?” %A Eric Priest %A Henrich, Joseph %A Celia Deane-Drummond %A Mary Ann Meyers %B Zygon %V 58 %P 378-383 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Zygon %D 2023 %T How Culture Made Us Uniquely Human %A Henrich, Joseph %B Zygon %V 58 %P 405-424 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Topics in Cognitive Science %D 2023 %T What makes us smart? %A Henrich, Joseph %A Muthukrishna, Michael %B Topics in Cognitive Science %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Current Directions in Psychological Science %D 2023 %T Historical Psychology %A Mohammad Atari %A Henrich, Joseph %B Current Directions in Psychological Science %P 1-8 %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1177/09637214221149737 %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain & Behavior %D 2023 %T Appealing to the minds of gods: Religious beliefs and appeals correspond to features of local social ecologies %A Bendixen, Theiss %A Coren Apicella %A Quentin Atkinson %A Emma Cohen %A Henrich, Joseph %A McNamara, Rita A. %A Norenzayan, Ara %A Aiyana K. Willard %A Dimitris Xygalatas %A Benjamin Grant Purzycki %B Religion, Brain & Behavior %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2023.2178487 %0 Journal Article %J Trends in Cognitive Sciences %D 2022 %T Over-reliance on English hinders cognitive science %A Damián E. Blasi %A Henrich, Joseph %A Evangelia Adamou %A David Kemmerer %A Asifa Majid %B Trends in Cognitive Sciences %V 26 %G eng %U https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/fulltext/S1364-6613(22)00236-4?rss=yes %N 12 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2022 %T Cultural evolution may influence heritability by shaping assortative mating %A Zeng, Tian Chen %A Henrich, Joseph %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 45 %P e181 %G eng %U https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/abs/cultural-evolution-may-influence-heritability-by-shaping-assortative-mating/DCAFE3361A60781FAEE52C650DFB47D0 %0 Journal Article %J Review of Philosophy and Psychology %D 2022 %T A Cultural Species and its Cognitive Phenotypes: Implications for Philosophy %A Henrich, Joseph %A Damián E. Blasi %A Cameron M. Curtin %A Helen Elizabeth Davis %A Hong, Ze %A Kelly, Daniel %A Ivan Kroupin %B Review of Philosophy and Psychology %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00612-y %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain & Behavior %D 2022 %T Cognitive bugs, alternative models, and new data %A Henrich, Joseph %B Religion, Brain & Behavior %P 42-58 %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2021.1991462 %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain & Behavior %D 2022 %T The Evolution of Religion and Morality Project: Reflections and Looking Ahead %A Benjamin Grant Purzycki %A Lang, Martin %A Henrich, Joseph %A Norenzayan, Ara %B Religion, Brain & Behavior %V 12 %P 190-211 %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2021.2021546 %N 1-2 %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain & Behavior %D 2022 %T Guiding the Evolution of the Evolutionary Sciences of Religion: A Discussion %A Benjamin Grant Purzycki %A Lang, Martin %A Henrich, Joseph %A Norenzayan, Ara %B Religion, Brain & Behavior %V 12 %P 226-232 %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2021.2021552 %N 1-2 %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain & Behavior %D 2022 %T The religiosity gender gap in 14 diverse societies %A Vardy, T. %A Moya, C. %A Placek, C. %A C. D. Apicella %A Bolyanatz, A. %A Cohen, E. %A Handley, C. %A Kundtová Klocová, E. %A Lesorogol, C. %A Mathew, S. %A McNamara, R. A. %A Purzycki, B. G. %A Soler, M. %A Weigel, J. %A Willard, A. K. %A Xygalatas, D. %A Norenzayan, A. %A Henrich, J. %A Lang, M. %A Atkinson, Q. D. %B Religion, Brain & Behavior %V 12 %P 18-37 %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2021.2006292 %N 1-2 %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain & Behavior %D 2022 %T Material insecurity predicts greater commitment to moralistic and less commitment to local deities: A cross-cultural investigation %A Baimel, A. %A Apicella, C. L. %A Atkinson, Q. %A Bolyanatz, A. %A Cohen, E. %A Handley, C. %A Henrich, J. %A Kundtová Klocová, E. %A Lang, M. %A Lesogorol, C. %A Mathew, S. %A McNamara, R. A. %A Moya, C. %A Norenzayan, A. %A Placek, C. %A Soler, M. %A Vardy, T. %A Weigel, J. %A Willard, A. K. %A Xygalatas, D. %A Purzycki, B. G. %X

The existential security hypothesis predicts that in the absence of more successful secular institutions, people will be attracted to religion when they are materially insecure. Most assessments, however, employ data sampled at a state-level with a focus on world religions. Using individual-level data collected in societies of varied community sizes with diverse religious traditions including animism, shamanism, polytheism, and monotheism, we conducted a systematic cross-cultural test (N = 1820; 14 societies) of the relationship between material insecurity (indexed by food insecurity) and religious commitment (indexed by both beliefs and practices). Moreover, we examined the relationship between material security and individuals’ commitment to two types of deities (moralistic and local), thus providing the first simultaneous test of the existential security hypothesis across co-existing traditions. Our results indicate that while material insecurity is associated with greater commitment to moralistic deities, it predicts less commitment to local deity traditions.

%B Religion, Brain & Behavior %V 12 %P 4-17 %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2021.2006287 %N 1-2 %0 Journal Article %J Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B %D 2022 %T Dominance in Humans %A Zeng, Tian Chen %A Cheng, Joey T. %A Henrich, Joseph %X Dominance is the aspect of social hierarchy that arises from agonistic interactions involving actual aggression or threats and intimidation. Accumulating evidence points to its importance in humans and its separation from prestige–an alternate mechanism in which status arises from competence or benefit-generation ability. In this review, we first provide an overview of the theoretical underpinnings of dominance as a concept, as well as some complications regarding the application of this concept to humans, which often shade into arguments that minimise its importance as a determinant of social influence in our species. We then review empirical evidence for its continued importance in human groups, including the effects of dominance rank on measurable outcomes such as social influence and reproductive fitness (independently of prestige), evidence for a specialized dominance psychology, and evidence for gender-specific effects. Finally, because human-specific factors such as norms and coalitions may place bounds on purely coercive status-attainment strategies, we end by considering key situations and contexts that increase the likelihood for dominance status to coexist alongside prestige status within the same individual, including how: 1) institutional power and authority tend to elicit dominance; 2) dominance-enhancing traits can at times generate benefits for others (prestige), and 3) certain dominance cues and ethology may lead to mis-attributions of prestige. %B Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B %V 377 %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0451 %N 1845 %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain & Behavior %D 2022 %T The Moralization Bias of Gods' Minds: A Cross-Cultural Test %A Benjamin Grant Purzycki %A Aiyana K. Willard %A Klocová, Eva Kundtová %A Coren Apicella %A Quentin Atkinson %A Bolyanatz, Alexander %A Emma Cohen %A Handley, Carla %A Henrich, Joseph %A Lang, Martin %A Lesorogol, Carolyn %A Sarah Mathew %A McNamara, Rita A. %A Cristina Moya %A Norenzayan, Ara %A Placek, Caitlyn %A Soler, Montserrat %A Vardy, Tom %A Jonathan Weigel %A Dimitris Xygalatas %A Ross, Cody T. %X There are compelling reasons to expect that cognitively representing any active, powerful deity motivates cooperative behavior. One mechanism underlying this association could be a cognitive bias toward generally attributing moral concern to anthropomorphic agents. If humans cognitively represent the minds of deities and humans in the same way, and if human agents are generally conceptualized as having moral concern, a broad tendency to attribute moral concern—a “moralization bias”—to supernatural deities follows. Using data from 2,228 individuals in 15 different field sites, we test for the existence of such a bias. We find that people are indeed more likely than chance to indicate that local deities are concerned with punishing theft, murder, and deceit. This effect is stable even after holding constant the effects of beliefs about explicitly moralistic deities. Additionally, we take a close look at data collected among Hadza foragers and find two of their deities to be morally interested. There is no evidence to suggest that this effect is due to direct missionary contact. We posit that the “moralization bias of gods’ minds” is part of a widespread but variable religious phenotype, and a candidate mechanism that contributes to the well-recognized association between religion and cooperation. %B Religion, Brain & Behavior %V 12 %P 38-60 %G eng %U https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2021.2006291 %N 1-2 %0 Journal Article %J Human Nature %D 2021 %T The Cultural Evolution of Epistemic Practices %A Hong, Ze %A Henrich, Joseph %K bayesian reasoning %K cultural evolution %K divination %K information transmission %X Although a substantial literature in anthropology and comparative religion explores divination across diverse societies and back into history, little research has integrated the older ethnographic and historical work with recent insights on human learning, cultural transmission, and cognitive science. Here we present evidence showing that divination practices are often best viewed as an epistemic technology, and we for- mally model the scenarios under which individuals may overestimate the efficacy of divination that contribute to its cultural omnipresence and historical persistence. We found that strong prior belief, underreporting of negative evidence, and misinferring belief from behavior can all contribute to biased and inaccurate beliefs about the effectiveness of epistemic technologies. We finally suggest how scientific epistemol- ogy, as it emerged in Western societies over the past few centuries, has influenced the importance and cultural centrality of divination practices. %B Human Nature %I Springer US %V 32 %P 622-651 %8 aug %@ 0123456789 %G eng %U https://link-springer-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/article/10.1007/s12110-021-09408-6?utm_source=toc&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=toc_12110_32_3&utm_content=etoc_springer_20211002 %R 10.1007/s12110-021-09408-6 %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2021 %T Treatment of missing data determined conclusions regarding moralizing gods %A Beheim, Bret %A Quentin D. Atkinson %A Bulbulia, Joseph %A Gervais, Will %A Gray, Russell D. %A Henrich, Joseph %A Lang, Martin %A Monroe, M. Willis %A Muthukrishna, Michael %A Norenzayan, Ara %A Benjamin Grant Purzycki %A Shariff, Azim %A Slingerland, Edward %A Spicer, Rachel %A Aiyana K. Willard %K Article %B Nature %I Springer US %V 595 %P E29–E34 %8 jul %G eng %U http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03655-4 http://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03655-4 %N 7866 %R 10.1038/s41586-021-03655-4 %0 Journal Article %J Economic Letters %D 2021 %T Tabulated Nonsense? Testing the Validity of the Ethnographic Atlas %A Bahrami-Rad, D %A Becker, A. %A Henrich, J %X The Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967), an anthropological database, is widely used across the social sciences. The Atlas is a quantified and discretely categorized collection of information gleaned from ethnographies covering more than 1200 pre-industrial societies. While being popular in many fields, it has been subject to skepticism within cultural anthropology. We assess the Atlas’s validity by comparing it with representative data from descendants of the portrayed societies. We document positive associations between the historical measures collected by ethnographers and self-reported data from 790,000 individuals across 43 countries. %B Economic Letters %V 204 %P 109880 %8 2021 %G eng %U https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176521001579 %0 Journal Article %J Current Biology %D 2021 %T Cultural evolution: Is causal inference the secret of our success? %A Henrich, J %B Current Biology %V 31 %P R381-R383 %G eng %U https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982221002207?dgcid=author %N 8 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America %D 2021 %T Dominance is necessary to explain human status hierarchies [Comment on Durkee, Lukaszewski, and Buss] %A Cheng, J T %A Tracy, J L %A Henrich, J %B Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America %V 118 %G eng %U https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__psyarxiv.com_w28nt&d=DwMFAg&c=WO-RGvefibhHBZq3fL85hQ&r=r4H_lCpfBoOe2ZZRxNvymJFotgl4kLbBkUqUTRQgA1g&m=uUkQvDjG7C9l7Wt4hkL7HNZBEMSaze6K9N347SdcoDA&s=ZC3tta4HaRAvnMo7NL3dzhvWHON5_N3DKa0ZcjPrLXY&e= %N 22 %0 Journal Article %J Evolutionary Human Sciences %D 2021 %T Machiavellian Strategist or Cultural Learner? Mentalizing and learning over development in a resource sharing game %A Baimel, A %A Juda, M %A Birch, S %A Henrich, J %B Evolutionary Human Sciences %V 3 %P e14 %G eng %U https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/evolutionary-human-sciences/article/machiavellian-strategist-or-cultural-learner-mentalizing-and-learning-over-development-in-a-resourcesharing-game/3775530F483D2FC580F8C763A990031C %0 Journal Article %J Evolutionary Human Sciences %D 2021 %T God's mind on morality %A McNamara, RA %A Senanayake, R %A Willard, A K %A Henrich, J %B Evolutionary Human Sciences %V 3 %P 1-19 %G eng %N e6 %0 Journal Article %J Annual Review of Psychology %D 2021 %T Psychology as a historical science %A Muthukrishna, M %A Henrich, J %A Slingerland, E %B Annual Review of Psychology %V 72 %P 717-749 %G eng %U http://www.annualreviews.org/eprint/HWMKDRKZREZDD5ADPXGS/full/10.1146/annurev-psych-082820-111436 %0 Journal Article %J Annual Review of Psychology %D 2021 %T The Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation %A Henrich, J %A Muthukrishna, M %B Annual Review of Psychology %V 72 %P 207-240 %G eng %U http://www.annualreviews.org/eprint/WCHW3YMWMC9D5SJEFVK3/full/10.1146/annurev-psych-081920-042106 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2021 %T Small gods, rituals, and cooperation: The Mentawai water spirit Sikameinan %A Singh, M %A Kaptchuk, T J %A Henrich, J %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 42 %P 61-72 %G eng %U https://osf.io/bjq6f/ %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2020 %T Reply to: Life and death decisions of autonomous vehicles %A Awad, E %A Dsouza, S %A Kim, R %A Schulz, J %A Henrich, J %A Shariff, A %A Bonnefon, J-F %A Rahwan, I %B Nature %V 579 %P E3-E5 %G eng %U https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-1988-3 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2020 %T Beyond WEIRD: A review of the last decade and a look ahead to the global laboratory of the future %A C.L. Apicella %A Norenzayan, A %A Henrich, J %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 41 %P 319-329 %G eng %U https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1090513820300957 %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2020 %T Kinship intensity and the use of mental states in moral judgment across societies %A Curtin, C M %A Barrett, H C %A Bolyanatz, A %A Crittenden, A %A Fessler, D M T %A Fitzpatrick, S %A Gurven, M %A Kanovsky, M %A Kushnick, G %A S Laurence %A Pisor, A %A Scelza, B %A S Stich %A von Rueden, C %A Henrich, J %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 41 %P 415-429 %G eng %U https://osf.io/65krf/?view_only=bf6e60c9934e4b1f9bd0f25d40e6b568 %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Evolutionary Human Sciences %D 2020 %T Why do religious leaders observe costly prohibitions? Examining taboos on Mentawai shamans %A Singh, M %A Henrich, J %B Evolutionary Human Sciences %V 2 %P doi:10.1017/ehs.2020.32 %G eng %U https://osf.io/3mbkz/ %N E32 %0 Journal Article %J Psychological Science %D 2020 %T Beyond Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) Psychology: Measuring and Mapping Scales of Cultural and Psychological Distance %A Muthukrishna, M %A Bell, A V %A Henrich, J %A Curtin, C M %A Gedranovich, A %A McInerney, J %A Thue, B %B Psychological Science %G eng %U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797620916782 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Personality and Social Psychology %D 2020 %T Two Signals of Social Rank: Prestige and dominance are associated with distinct nonverbal displays %A Witkower, Z %A Tracy, J. L. %A J. T. Cheng %A Henrich, J. %B Journal of Personality and Social Psychology %V 118 %P 89-120 %G eng %U https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-22179-001 %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Science %D 2019 %T The church, intensive kinship, and global psychological variation %A Schulz, J %A Beauchamp, J %A Bahrami-Rad, D %A Henrich, J %B Science %V 366 %P 1-12 %G eng %U https://datadryad.org/stash/dataset/doi:10.5061/dryad.2rbnzs7hs %N 707 %0 Journal Article %J PNAS %D 2019 %T Work time and market integration in the original affluent society %A Bhui, R %A Chudek, M %A Henrich, J %B PNAS %P 1-6 %G eng %U https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2019/10/08/1906196116 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology %D 2019 %T How exploitation launched human cooperation %A Bhui, R. %A Chudek, M. %A Henrich, J. %B Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology %V 73 %P 1-14 %G eng %U https://rdcu.be/bDXQX %N 78 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %D 2019 %T Moralizing gods, impartiality, and religious parochialism across 15 societies %A Lang, M %A Purzycki, B. G. %A Apicella, C. L. %A Atkinson, Q. D. %A Bolyanatz, A %A E Cohen %A Handley, C %A Klocova, E. K. %A Lesorogol, C %A Mathew, S. %A McNamara, R. A. %A Moya, C %A Placek, C D %A Soler, M %A Vardy, T %A Weigel, J L %A Willard, A K %A Xygalatas, D %A Norenzayan, A %A Henrich, J %B Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %V 286 %G eng %U https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rspb.2019.0202 %0 Journal Article %J PNAS %D 2019 %T Genetic legacy of state centralization in the Kuba Kingdom of the Democratic Republic of the Congo %A Lucy van Dorp %A Sara Lowes %A Weigel, Jonathan L %A Naser Ansari-Pour %A Saioa Lopez %A Javier Mendoza-Revilla %A Robinson, James A. %A Henrich, J %A Thomas, M G %A Nunn, N %A Hellenthal, G %B PNAS %V 116 %P 593-598 %G eng %U https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2018/12/18/1811211115.short %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Nature Human Behavior %D 2019 %T A problem in theory %A Muthukrishna, M %A Henrich, J %B Nature Human Behavior %G eng %U https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-018-0522-1.epdf?author_access_token=UNn5NfKkdenX2XOtRn-a89RgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0PR1n9_3i-MM3VzdUMeSGjuHL3rzkkW8mnQZYKonzAh5oUPDZHAQYa3tsgkHBp3QPi2x94zvRmVSupO1uif43JYttNHav4CunuTrACnWXGjIw%3D%3D %0 Journal Article %J Nature Human Behavior: Letter %D 2019 %T War increases religiosity %A Henrich, J. %A Bauer, M. %A Cassar, A %A Chytilova, J %A Purzycki, B. G. %B Nature Human Behavior: Letter %G eng %U https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-018-0512-3.epdf?author_access_token=G8SE3Pil2BHi3WZe4LTeF9RgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0OENBSMz4xtkQR5Q5rg2zGHa5yYlApm_JSd3eToKlmk7Q90RfHfcSnIkfaVOc_8IVFGesBKaFGHd0wX-VCBI6zsppiOdpsNsXks2tvRyRyfKQ%3D%3D %0 Journal Article %J Cognition %D 2019 %T Weighing Outcome vs. Intent Across Societies: How cultural models of mind shape moral reasoning %A McNamara, R. A. %A Willard, A. K. %A Norenzayan, A. %A Henrich, J. %B Cognition %V 182 %P 95-108 %G eng %U https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027718302440 %0 Report %D 2018 %T Pressing questions in the study of psychological and behavioral diversity %A Hruschka, D. %A Medin, Douglas %A Rogoff, Barbara %A Henrich, J %B PNAS %V 115 %P 1-3 %G eng %U https://www.pnas.org/content/115/45/11366.short %N 45 %0 Journal Article %J Current Biology %D 2018 %T Human Cooperation: The Hunter-Gatherer Puzzle %A Henrich, J. %B Current Biology %V 28 %P R1143-R1145 %G eng %U https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(18)31050-9 %N 19 %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2018 %T The Moral Machine Experiment %A Awad, E %A Dsouza, S %A Kim, R %A Schulz, J %A Henrich, J %A Shariff, A %A Bonnefon, J. F %A Rahwan, I %B Nature %V 563 %P 59-64 %G eng %U https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0637-6 %N 7729 %0 Journal Article %J PLOS Computational Biology %D 2018 %T The Cultural Brain Hypothesis: How culture drives brain expansion, sociality, and life history %A Muthukrishna, Michael %A Doebeli, Max %A Chudek, Maciej %A Henrich, Joseph %B PLOS Computational Biology %V 14 %P e1006504 %G eng %U https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006504 %N 11 %0 Journal Article %J PLoS ONE %D 2018 %T Overconfidence is Universal? Elicitation of Genuine Overconfidence (EGO) procedure reveals systematic differences across domain, task knowledge, and incentives in four populations %A Muthukrishna, M. %A Henrich, J. %A Toyakawa, W. %A Hamamura, T. %A Kameda, T %A Heine, S. J. %B PLoS ONE %V 13 %G eng %U https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0202288 %N 8 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2018 %T The Cognitive and Cultural Foundations of Moral Behavior %A Purzycki, B. G. %A Pisor, A. %A Apicella, C. %A Atkinson, Q. %A Cohen, E. %A Henrich, J. %A McElreath, R. %A McNamara, R. %A Norenzayan, A. %A Willard, A. %A Xygalatas, D. %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 39 %P 490-501 %G eng %U https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513817303239 %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J PLoS ONE %D 2018 %T Material security, life history, and moralistic religions: A cross-cultural examination %A Purzycki, B. G. %A Ross, C. T. %A Apicella, C. %A Atkinson, Q. %A Cohen, E. %A McNamara, R. A. %A Willard, A. K. %A Xygalatas, D. %A Norenzayan, A. %A Henrich, J. %B PLoS ONE %V 13 %P e0193856 %G eng %U http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0193856 %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain & Behavior %D 2018 %T Do minds switch bodies? Dualist interpretations across ages and societies %A Chudek, Maciej %A McNamara, Rita %A Birch, Susan %A Bloom, Paul %A Henrich, Joseph %B Religion, Brain & Behavior %V 8 %P 354-368 %G eng %U http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2153599X.2017.1377757 %N 4 %0 Book %B Religion, Brain and Behavior %D 2018 %T The Evolution of Religion and Morality %E Benjamin Grant Purzycki %E Henrich, Joseph %E Norenzayan, Ara %B Religion, Brain and Behavior %I Religion, Brain Behavior %V 8 %G eng %U https://www-tandfonline-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/toc/rrbb20/8/2 %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain and Behavior %D 2018 %T The evolution of religion and morality: A synthesis of ethnographic and experimental evidence from eight societies %A Purzycki, B. G. %A Henrich, J. %A Apicella, C. %A Atkinson, Q. %A Baimel, A. %A Cohen, E. %A McNamara, R. A. %A Willard, A. K. %A Xygalatas, D. %A Norenzayan, A. %B Religion, Brain and Behavior %V 8 %P 101-132 %G eng %U https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2153599X.2016.1267027 %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain and Behavior %D 2018 %T Jesus vs. the Ancestors: How specific religious beliefs shape prosociality on Yasawa Island, Fiji %A McNamara, R. A. %A Henrich, J. %B Religion, Brain and Behavior %V 8 %P 185-204 %G eng %U https://www-tandfonline-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/2153599X.2016.1267030 %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Nature Human Behaviour %D 2017 %T Corrupting Cooperation and How Anti-Corruption Strategies May Backfire %A Muthukrishna, M. %A P. Francois %A S. Pourahmadi %A Henrich, J. %B Nature Human Behaviour %V 1 %G eng %U https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0138 %N 0138 %0 Journal Article %J Science %D 2017 %T High Fidelity %A Henrich, Joseph %B Science %V 356 %P 810 %G eng %U http://science.sciencemag.org/content/356/6340/810 %N 6340 %0 Book Section %B Chimpanzees and Human Evolution %D 2017 %T Cultural Evolution in Chimpanzees and Humans %A Henrich, J. %A Tennie, C. %E M. Muller %E Wrangham, R. %E Pilbeam, D. %B Chimpanzees and Human Evolution %I Harvard University Press %C Cambridge, MA %P 645-702 %G eng %U http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674967953 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2016 %T Parochial prosocial religions: Historical and contemporary evidence for a cultural evolutionary process. %A Norenzayan, A. %A Shariff, A. F. %A Gervais, W. M. %A Willard, A. %A McNamara, R. %A Slingerland, E. %A Henrich, J. %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 39 %P 43-65 %G eng %U https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/parochial-prosocial-religions-historical-and-contemporary-evidence-for-a-cultural-evolutionary-process/6A1CEFA11F5B46308242D4D47854D0D8/core-reader %0 Journal Article %J Scientific Data %D 2016 %T Cross-cultural dataset for the Evolution of Religion and Morality Project %A Benjamin Purzycki %A Coren L. Apicella %A Quentin Atkinson %A Emma Cohen %A McNamara, Rita %A Willard, Aiyana %A Dimitris Xygalatas %A Norenzayan, Ara %A Henrich, Joseph %B Scientific Data %V 3 %P 10.1038/sdata.2016.99 %G eng %U http://www.nature.com/articles/sdata201699 %N 160099 %0 Journal Article %J Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. %D 2016 %T Understanding cumulative cultural evolution %A Henrich, Joseph %A Boyd, Robert %A Maxime Derex %A Michelle A. Kline %A Mesoudi, Alex %A Muthukrishna, Michael %A Adam T. Powell %A Shennan, Stephen J. %A Mark G. Thomas %B Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. %V 113 %P E6724-E6725 %G eng %U http://www.pnas.org/content/113/44/E6724.extract %N 44 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 2016 %T Can War Foster Cooperation? %A Bauer, M. %A Blattman, C. %A Chytilova, J. %A Henrich, J. %A Miguel, E. %A Mitts., T. %B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 30 %P 249–274 %G eng %U https://www-aeaweb-org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/articles?id=10.1257/jep.30.3.249 %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Human Nature %D 2016 %T Food Aversions and Cravings during Pregnancy on Yasawa Island, Fiji %A L. McKerracher %A M. Collard %A Henrich, J. %B Human Nature %V 27 %P 296-315 %G eng %U http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12110-016-9262-y %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Human Nature %D 2016 %T Memory and Belief in the Transmission of Counterintuitive Content %A Willard, A. K. %A Henrich, J. %A Norenzayan, A. %B Human Nature %V 27 %P 221-243 %G eng %U http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12110-016-9259-6 %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2016 %T Kin and Kinship Psychology both influence cooperative coordination in Yasawa, Fiji %A McNamara, Rita Anne %A Henrich, Joseph %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 38 %P 197-207 %G eng %U http://www.ehbonline.org/article/S1090-5138(16)30248-3/fulltext?rss=yes %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Current Biology %D 2016 %T What is the association between religious affiliation and children’s altruism? %A Shariff, A. F. %A Willard, A. K. %A Muthukrishna, M. %A Kramer, S. R. %A Henrich, J. %B Current Biology %V 26 %P R699–R700 %G eng %U http://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(16)30670-4 %N 15 %0 Journal Article %J Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B %D 2016 %T Innovation in the Collective Brain %A Muthukrishna, Michael %A Henrich, Joseph %B Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B %V 371 %P doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0192 %G eng %U http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/371/1690/20150192 %N 1690 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Experimental Psychology: General %D 2016 %T Listen, Follow Me: Dynamic Vocal Signals of Dominance Predict Emergent Social Rank in Humans %A J. T. Cheng %A Tracy, J. L. %A S. Ho %A Henrich, J. %B Journal of Experimental Psychology: General %V 145 %P 536–547 %G eng %U http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.displayrecord&uid=2016-15301-001 %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States %D 2016 %T Small-Scale Societies Exhibit Fundamental Variation in the Role of Intentions in Moral Judgment %A Barrett, H. Clark %A Alex Bolyanatz %A Alyssa N. Crittenden %A Daniel M.T. Fessler %A Simon Fitzpatrick %A Gurven, Michael %A Henrich, Joseph %A Martin Kanovsky %A Geoff Kushnick %A Anne Pisor %A Brooke Scelza %A Stephen Stich %A Chris von Rueden %A Wanying Zhaog %A Stephen Laurence %B Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States %V 133 %P 4688–4693 %G eng %U http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2016/03/22/1522070113.full?sid=731ea871-4c02-4d47-a82e-b3833e89a7c2 %N 17 %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2016 %T Moralistic gods, supernatural punishment and the expansion of human sociality %A Benjamin Grant Purzycki %A Coren Apicella %A Quentin D. Atkinson %A Emma Cohen %A McNamara, Rita Anne %A Aiyana K. Willard %A Dimitris Xygalatas %A Norenzayan, Ara %A Henrich, Joseph %B Nature %V 530 %P 327–330 %G eng %U https://www.nature.com/articles/nature16980 %N 7590 %0 Journal Article %J Current Opinion in Psychology %D 2016 %T Culture–gene coevolutionary psychology: cultural learning, language, and ethnic psychology %A Cristina Moya %A Henrich, Joseph %B Current Opinion in Psychology %V 8 %P 112-118 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2016 %T How evolved psychological mechanisms empower cultural group selection %A Henrich, J. %A Boyd, R. %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 39 %P doi: 10.1017/S0140525X15000138 %G eng %U http://journals.cambridge.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10224984&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0140525X15000138 %0 Journal Article %J Child Development %D 2016 %T Similarities and differences in maternal responsiveness in three societies: Evidence from Fiji, Kenya and US %A Broesch, T. %A Rochat, P. %A Olah, K. %A Broesch, J. %A Henrich, J. %B Child Development %V 87 %P 700-11. %G eng %U http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cdev.12501/abstract %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2016 %T The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions %A Norenzayan, A. %A Shariff, A. F. %A Gervais, W. M. %A Willard, A. %A McNamara, R. %A Slingerland, E. %A Henrich, J. %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 39 %P 1-19 %G eng %U http://journals.cambridge.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10188732&fileId=S0140525X14001356 %< CAN YOU SEE THIS.? %0 Journal Article %J Religion, Brain & Behavior %D 2016 %T Supernatural punishment, in-group biases, and material insecurity: Experiments and Ethnography from Yasawa, Fiji %A McNamara, Rita Anne %A Norenzayan, Ara %A Henrich, Joseph %B Religion, Brain & Behavior %V 6 %P 34-55 %@ 2153-599X %G eng %U http://www-tandfonline-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/2153599X.2014.921235 %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2016 %T The When and Who of Social Learning and Conformist Transmission %A Muthukrishna, Michael %A Morgan, Thomas Joshua Henry %A Henrich, Joseph %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 37 %P 10-20 %8 2015 %G eng %N 1 %0 Book Section %B International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences %D 2015 %T Prosocial Behavior, Cultural Differences in %A Hruschka, D. %A Henrich, J %B International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences %7 2nd %I Elsevier %P 238-243 %G eng %U https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780080970868241032?via%3Dihub %0 Journal Article %J Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B %D 2015 %T The Big Man Mechanism: how prestige fosters cooperation and creates prosocial leaders %A Henrich, Joseph %A Chudek, Maciej %A Boyd, Robert %B Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B %V 370 %G eng %U https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2015.0013 %N 1683 %0 Journal Article %J Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences %D 2015 %T Culture and social behavior %A Henrich, J. %B Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences %V 3 %P 84-89 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the Royal Society B %D 2015 %T Moral parochialism and contextual contingency across seven societies %A Fessler, D. M. T. %A H. C. Barret %A Kanovsky, M. %A Stich, S. %A C. Holbrook %A Henrich, J. %A A. H. Bolyanatz %A M. M. Gervais %A Gurven, M. %A Kushnick, G. %A A. C. Pisor %A von Rueden, C. %A Laurence, S. %B Proceedings of the Royal Society B %V 282 %P 20150907 %G eng %U http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/content/282/1813/20150907 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2015 %T The expression and adaptive significance of pregnancy-related nausea, vomiting, and aversions on Yasawa Island, Fiji %A L. McKerracher %A M. Collard %A Henrich, J. %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 36 %P 95-102 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book %D 2015 %T The Secret of Our Success: How culture is driving human evolution, domesticating our species, and making us smart %A Henrich, Joseph %X

Humans are a puzzling species. On the one hand, we struggle to survive on our own in the wild, often unable to solve basic problems, like obtaining food, building shelters or avoiding predators. On the other hand, human groups have produced innovative technologies, sophisticated languages, and complex institutions that have permitted us to successfully expand into environments across the globe. What has enabled us to dominate such a vast range of environments, more than any other species? The Secret of Our Success lies not in our innate intelligence, but in our collective brains—in the ability of human groups to socially interconnect and to learn from one another.

Drawing insights from lost European explorers, clever chimpanzees, hunter-gatherers, neuroscientists, ancient bones, and the human genome, Joseph Henrich demonstrates how our collective brains have propelled our species’ genetic evolution, and shaped our biology. Our early capacities for learning from others produced many innovations, such as fire, cooking, water containers, plant knowledge and projectile weapons, which in turn drove the expansion of our brains and altered our physiology, anatomy and psychology in crucial ways. Further on, some collective brains generated and recombined powerful concepts, such as the lever, wheel, screw and writing. Henrich shows how our genetics and biology are inextricably interwoven with cultural evolution, and that this unique culture-gene interaction has propelled our species on a unique evolutionary trajectory.

Tracking clues from our ancient past to the present, The Secret of Our Success explores how our cultural and social natures produce a collective intelligence that explains both our species striking uniqueness and odd peculiarities.

Visit the book website here.

%I Princeton University Press %C Princeton, NJ %G eng %U http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10543.html %0 Book Section %B The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology %D 2015 %T Cultural Evolution %A Chudek, Maciej. %A Muthukrishna, Michael %A Henrich, Joseph %E Buss, David M. %B The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology %7 2nd %I John Wiley and Sons %V 2 %G eng %6 2 %& 30 %0 Journal Article %J Topics in Cognitive Science %D 2015 %T Reasoning about cultural and genetic transmission: Developmental and cross-cultural evidence from Peru, Fiji, and the US on how people make inferences about trait and identity transmission %A Moya, C. %A Boyd, R. %A Henrich, J. %B Topics in Cognitive Science %V 7 %P 595-610 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2015 %T Transmission and development of costly punishment in children %A Salali, Gul Deniz %A Juda, Myriam %A Henrich, Joseph %K children %K cooperation %K costly punishment %K cultural transmission %X

Evolutionary theorists argue that cultural evolution has harnessed various aspects of our evolved psychology to create a variety of different mechanisms for sustaining social norms, including those related to large-scale cooperation. One of these mechanisms, costly punishment, has emerged in experiments as an effective means to sustain cooperation in some societies. If this view is correct, individuals' willingness to engage in the costly punishment of norm violators should be culturally transmittable, and applicable to both prosocial and anti-social behaviors (to any social norm). Since much existing work shows that norm-based prosocial behavior in experiments develops substantially during early and middle childhood, we tested 245 3- to 8-year olds in a simplified third party punishment game to investigate whether children would imitate a model's decision to punish, at a personal cost, both unequal and equal offers. Our study showed that children, regardless of their age, imitate the costly punishment of both equal and unequal offers, and the rates of imitation increase (not decrease) with age. However, only older children imitate not-punishing for both equal and unequal offers. These findings highlight the potential role of cultural transmission in the stabilization or de-stabilization of costly punishment in a population.

%B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 36 %P 86-94 %8 3// %@ 1090-5138 %G eng %0 Book %D 2014 %T Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective %E Ensminger, J. %E Henrich, J. %X

Questions about the origins of human cooperation have long puzzled and divided scientists. Social norms that foster fair-minded behavior, altruism and collective action undergird the foundations of large-scale human societies, but we know little about how these norms develop or spread, or why the intensity and breadth of human cooperation varies among different populations. What is the connection between social norms that encourage fair dealing and economic growth? How are these social norms related to the emergence of centralized institutions? Informed by a pioneering set of cross-cultural data, Experimenting with Social Norms advances our understanding of the evolution of human cooperation and the expansion of complex societies.

Editors Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich present evidence from an exciting collaboration between anthropologists and economists. Using experimental economics games, researchers examined levels of fairness, cooperation, and norms for punishing those who violate expectations of equality across a diverse swath of societies, from hunter-gatherers in Tanzania to a small town in rural Missouri. These experiments tested individuals’ willingness to conduct mutually beneficial transactions with strangers that reap rewards only at the expense of taking a risk on the cooperation of others. The results show a robust relationship between exposure to market economies and social norms that benefit the group over narrow economic self-interest. Levels of fairness and generosity are generally higher among individuals in communities with more integrated markets. Religion also plays a powerful role. Individuals practicing either Islam or Christianity exhibited a stronger sense of fairness, possibly because religions with high moralizing deities, equipped with ample powers to reward and punish, encourage greater prosociality. The size of the settlement also had an impact. People in larger communities were more willing to punish unfairness compared to those in smaller societies. Taken together, the volume supports the hypothesis that social norms evolved over thousands of years to allow strangers in more complex and large settlements to coexist, trade and prosper.

Innovative and ambitious, Experimenting with Social Norms synthesizes an unprecedented analysis of social behavior from an immense range of human societies. The fifteen case studies analyzed in this volume, which include field experiments in Africa, South America, New Guinea, Siberia and the United States, are available for free download on the Foundation’s website.

%I Russell Sage Press %C New York %G eng %U https://www.russellsage.org/publications/experimenting-social-norms %0 Book Section %B In Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective %D 2014 %T Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundations—The Coevolution of Social Norms, Intrinsic Motivation, Markets, and the Institutions of Complex Societies. %A Henrich, J. %A Ensminger, J. %E Ensminger, J. %E Henrich, J. %B In Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective %I Russell Sage Press %C New York %G eng %0 Book Section %B Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective. %D 2014 %T Chapter 3: Cross-Cultural Experimental Methods, Sites, and Variables. %A Henrich, J. %A Ensminger, J. %E Ensminger, J. %E Henrich, J. %B Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective. %I Russell Sage Press %C New York %G eng %0 Book Section %B Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective %D 2014 %T Chapter 4: Empirical Results—Markets, Community Size, Religion and the Nature of Human Sociality %A Henrich, J. %A Ensminger, J. %E Ensminger, J. %E Henrich, J. %B Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective %I Russell Sage Press %C New York %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Human Nature %D 2014 %T Adaptive Content Biases in Learning about Animals Across the Lifecourse %A Broesch, J. %A Henrich, J. %A Barrett, H. C. %B Human Nature %V 25 %P 181-199 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book Section %B Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective %D 2014 %T Fairness without punishment: behavioral experiments in the Yasawa Island, Fiji %A Henrich, J. %A Henrich, N. %E Ensminger, J. %E Henrich, J. %B Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective %I Russell Sage Press %C New York %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Human Nature %D 2014 %T Impartial Institutions, Pathogen Stress and the Expanding Social Network %A Hruschka, D. %A Efferson, C. %A Jiang, T. %A Falletta-Cowden, A. %A Sigurdsson, S. %A McNamara, R. %A Sands, M. %A Munira, S. %A Slingerland, E. %A Henrich, J. %K cooperation %K cross-cultural analysis %K evolution %K insecurity %K institutions %K intergroup bias %K MARKETS %K parasite %K parochialism %K pathogen %K psychology %K Punishment %K scale %K society %K system %X

Anthropologists have documented substantial cross-society variation in people's willingness to treat strangers with impartial, universal norms versus favoring members of their local community. Researchers have proposed several adaptive accounts for these differences. One variant of the pathogen stress hypothesis predicts that people will be more likely to favor local in-group members when they are under greater infectious disease threat. The material security hypothesis instead proposes that institutions that permit people to meet their basic needs through impartial interactions with strangers reinforce a tendency toward impartiality, whereas people lacking such institutions must rely on local community members to meet their basic needs. Some studies have examined these hypotheses using self-reported preferences, but not with behavioral measures. We conducted behavioral experiments in eight diverse societies that measure individuals' willingness to favor in-group members by ignoring an impartial rule. Consistent with the material security hypothesis, members of societies enjoying better-quality government services and food security show a stronger preference for following an impartial rule over investing in their local in-group. Our data show no support for the pathogen stress hypothesis as applied to favoring in-groups and instead suggest that favoring in-group members more closely reflects a general adaptive fit with social institutions that have arisen in each society.

%B Human Nature %V 25 %P 567-579 %8 Dec %@ 1045-6767 %G English %N 4 %M WOS:000346045000008 %! Hum Nature-Int BiosHum Nature-Int Bios %0 Book Section %B Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective %D 2014 %T Introduction %A Ensminger, Jean %A Henrich, J. %E Ensminger, Jean %E Henrich, J. %B Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective %I Russell Sage Press %C New York %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Science %D 2014 %T Rice, Psychology and Innovation %A Henrich, J. %B Science %V 344 %P 593 %G eng %N 6184 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %D 2014 %T Sociality influences cultural complexity %A Muthukrishna, Michael %A Shulman, Ben W %A Vasilescu, Vlad %A Henrich, Joseph %B Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %V 281 %P 20132511 %@ 0962-8452 %G eng %N 1774 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2014 %T Tackling Group-Level Traits by Starting at the Start %A Chudek, M. %A Henrich, J. %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 37 %P 256-7 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Psychological Science %D 2014 %T War's Enduring Effects on the Development of Egalitarian Motivations and In-Group Biases %A Bauer, M. %A Cassar, A. %A Chytilova, J. %A Henrich, J. %K Altruism %K childhood development %K children %K civil-war %K conflict %K cooperation %K economic experiment %K egalitarianism %K evolution %K evolutionary psychology %K intergroup %K intergroup competition %K life %K parochialism %K Punishment %K Social Behavior %K Uncertainty %K War %X

In suggesting that new nations often coalesce in the decades following war, historians have posed an important psychological question: Does the experience of war generate an enduring elevation in people's egalitarian motivations toward their in-group? We administered social-choice tasks to more than 1,000 children and adults differentially affected by wars in the Republic of Georgia and Sierra Leone. We found that greater exposure to war created a lasting increase in people's egalitarian motivations toward their in-group, but not their out-groups, during a developmental window starting in middle childhood (around 7 years of age) and ending in early adulthood (around 20 years of age). Outside this window, war had no measurable impact on social motivations in young children and had only muted effects on the motivations of older adults. These war effects are broadly consistent with predictions from evolutionary approaches that emphasize the importance of group cooperation in defending against external threats, though they also highlight key areas in need of greater theoretical development.

%B Psychological Science %V 25 %P 47-57 %8 Jan %@ 0956-7976 %G English %N 1 %M WOS:000329486300005 %! Psychol Sci %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Personality and Social Psychology %D 2013 %T Two Ways to the Top: Evidence That Dominance and Prestige Are Distinct Yet Viable Avenues to Social Rank and Influence %A J. T. Cheng %A Tracy, J. L. %A T. Foulsham %A A. Kingstone %A Henrich, J. %B Journal of Personality and Social Psychology %V 104 %P 103-125 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Animal Behaviour %D 2013 %T Chimpanzees share food for many reasons: the role of kinship, reciprocity, social bonds and harassment on food transfers %A Silk, J. B. %A Brosnan, S. F. %A Henrich, J. %A Lambeth, S. P. %A Shapiro, S. %B Animal Behaviour %V 85 %P 941-947 %G eng %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Experimental Psychology-General %D 2013 %T Cross-cultural evidence that the pride expression is a universal automatic status signal %A Tracy, J. L. %A Shariff, A. F. %A Zhao, W. %A Henrich, J. %B Journal of Experimental Psychology-General %V 142 %P 163-180 %G eng %N 1 %0 Book Section %B Cultural Evolution: Society, Language, and Religion %D 2013 %T The Cultural Evolution of Technology: Facts and theories %A Boyd, R. %A Richerson, P. J. %A Henrich, J. %A Lupp, J. %E Richerson, P. J. %E Christiansen, M. H. %B Cultural Evolution: Society, Language, and Religion %S Strungmann Forum Reports %I MIT Press %C Cambridge, MA %V 12 %G eng %0 Book Section %B Signaling, Commitment, and Emotion %D 2013 %T Culture-Gene Coevolution, Large-Scale Cooperation and the Shaping of Human Social Psychology %A Chudek, M. %A Zhao, Wanying %A Henrich, Joseph %E Joyce, Richard %E Sterelny, Kim %E Calcott, Brett %B Signaling, Commitment, and Emotion %I MIT Press %C Cambridge %P 425-458 %G eng %0 Book Section %B Navigating the social world: What infants, children, and other species can teach us %D 2013 %T Culture-gene coevolutionary theory and children’s selective social learning %A Chudek, M. %A Brosseau‐Liard, Patricia E %A Birch, Susan %A Henrich, J. %E Mahzarin R. Banaji %E Gelman, Susan A %B Navigating the social world: What infants, children, and other species can teach us %I Oxford University Press %C Oxford %P 181 %@ 0199890714 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2013 %T The development of contingent reciprocity in children %A House, B. %A Henrich, J. %A Sarnecka, B. %A Silk, J. B. %K Altruism %K Child Development %K chimpanzees pan-troglodytes %K Cognition %K cooperation %K ecology %K evolution %K evolution of cooperation %K food transfers %K human prosociality %K prosociality %K Reciprocity %K sharing behavior %K task %X

Cooperation between nonrelatives is common in humans. Reciprocal altruism is a plausible evolutionary mechanism for cooperation within unrelated pairs, as selection may favor individuals who selectively cooperate with those who have cooperated with them in the past. Reciprocity is often observed in humans, but there is only limited evidence of reciprocal altruism in other primate species, raising questions about the origins of human reciprocity. Here, we explore how reciprocity develops in a sample of American children ranging from 3 to 7.5 years of age, and also compare children's behavior to that of chimpanzees in prior studies to gain insight into the phylogeny of human reciprocity. Children show a marked tendency to respond contingently to both prosocial and selfish acts, patterns that have not been seen among chimpanzees in prior studies. Our results show that reciprocity increases markedly with age in this population of children, and by about 5.5 years of age children consistently match the previous behavior of their partners. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.

%B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 34 %P 86-93 %8 Mar %@ 1090-5138 %G English %N 2 %M ISI:000315762900003 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences %D 2013 %T Early false-belief understanding in traditional non-Western societies %A Barrett, H. C. %A Broesch, T. %A Scott, R. M. %A He, Z. J. %A Baillargeon, R. %A Wu, D. %A Bolz, M. %A Henrich, J. %A Setoh, P. %A Wang, J. X. %A Laurence, S. %K 2-year-olds %K 2.5-year-olds evidence %K attribution %K cultures %K evolutionary psychology %K false-belief understanding %K human universals %K infants %K Knowledge %K metaanalysis %K mind development %K others beliefs %K Social cognition %K tasks %K Theory of Mind %X

The psychological capacity to recognize that others may hold and act on false beliefs has been proposed to reflect an evolved, species-typical adaptation for social reasoning in humans; however, controversy surrounds the developmental timing and universality of this trait. Cross-cultural studies using elicited-response tasks indicate that the age at which children begin to understand false beliefs ranges from 4 to 7 years across societies, whereas studies using spontaneous-response tasks with Western children indicate that false-belief understanding emerges much earlier, consistent with the hypothesis that false-belief understanding is a psychological adaptation that is universally present in early childhood. To evaluate this hypothesis, we used three spontaneous-response tasks that have revealed early false-belief understanding in the West to test young children in three traditional, non-Western societies: Salar (China), Shuar/Colono (Ecuador) and Yasawan (Fiji). Results were comparable with those from the West, supporting the hypothesis that false-belief understanding reflects an adaptation that is universally present early in development.

%B Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences %V 280 %P 20122654 %8 Mar 22 %@ 0962-8452 %G English %N 1755 %M ISI:000314357600002 %! P Roy Soc B-Biol Sci %0 Journal Article %J Frontiers in Human Neuroscience %D 2013 %T Economic and evolutionary hypotheses for cross-population variation in parochialism %A Hruschka,Daniel Jacob %A Henrich, Joseph %K Religion,Institutions,Cross-cultural,closeness,Parochialism,in-group favoritism,market integration,parasite stress %X

Human populations differ reliably in the degree to which people favor family, friends, and community members over strangers and outsiders. In the last decade, researchers have begun to propose several economic and evolutionary hypotheses for these cross-population differences in parochialism. In this paper, we outline major current theories and review recent attempts to test them. We also discuss the key methodological challenges in assessing these diverse economic and evolutionary theories for cross-population differences in parochialism.

%B Frontiers in Human Neuroscience %V 7 %P doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00559 %8 2013-September-1 %@ 1662-5161 %G English %N 559 %9 Review %! Cross-population variation in parochialism %0 Book Section %B Cultural Evolution: Society, Technology, Language and Religion %D 2013 %T The evolution of prosocial religions %A Slingerland, Edward %A Henrich, Joseph %A Norenzayan, Ara %E Peter J Richerson %E Christiansen, M. H. %B Cultural Evolution: Society, Technology, Language and Religion %I MIT Press %C Cambridge %G eng %0 Journal Article %J PloS One %D 2013 %T Institutions, parasites and the persistence of in-group preferences %A Hruschka, Daniel J %A Henrich, Joseph %B PloS One %V 8 %P e63642 %@ 1932-6203 %G eng %N 5 %0 Generic %D 2013 %T Interpretative Problems with Chimpanzee Ultimatum Games[Comment on Proctor et. al.] %A Henrich, J. %A Silk, J. B. %B PNAS %V 110 %P E3049 %G eng %U http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250049 %N 33 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America %D 2013 %T Ontogeny of prosocial behavior across diverse societies %A House, B. R. %A Silk, J. B. %A Henrich, J. %A Barrett, H. C. %A Scelza, B. A. %A Boyette, A. H. %A Hewlett, B. S. %A McElreath, R. %A Laurence, S. %K Altruism %K chimpanzees %K cooperation %K development %K evolution %K Fairness %K gene-culture coevolution %K perspective %K population differences %K Punishment %K recipient %K toddlers %K young-children %X

Humans are an exceptionally cooperative species, but there is substantial variation in the extent of cooperation across societies. Understanding the sources of this variability may provide insights about the forces that sustain cooperation. We examined the ontogeny of prosocial behavior by studying 326 children 3-14 y of age and 120 adults from six societies (age distributions varied across societies). These six societies span a wide range of extant human variation in culture, geography, and subsistence strategies, including foragers, herders, horticulturalists, and urban dwellers across the Americas, Oceania, and Africa. When delivering benefits to others was personally costly, rates of prosocial behavior dropped across all six societies as children approached middle childhood and then rates of prosociality diverged as children tracked toward the behavior of adults in their own societies. When prosocial acts did not require personal sacrifice, prosocial responses increased steadily as children matured with little variation in behavior across societies. Our results are consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of acquired cultural norms in shaping costly forms of cooperation and creating cross-cultural diversity.

%B Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America %V 110 %P 14586-14591 %8 Sep 3 %@ 0027-8424 %G English %N 36 %M ISI:000323886200032 %! P Natl Acad Sci USA %0 Book Section %B Cultural Evolution: Society, Technology, Language and Religion %D 2013 %T Religious prosociality: a synthesis %A Norenzayan, A. %A Henrich, J. %A Slingerland, E. %E Richerson, P. J. %E Christiansen, M. H. %B Cultural Evolution: Society, Technology, Language and Religion %I MIT Press %C Cambridge %P 365-380 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Human Nature-an Interdisciplinary Biosocial Perspective %D 2013 %T Teaching and the Life History of Cultural Transmission in Fijian Villages %A Kline, M. A. %A Boyd, R. %A Henrich, J. %K Adaptation %K Animals %K bias %K childhood %K children %K cultural transmission %K emergence %K evolution %K humanevolution %K Learning %K paradox %K social-learning strategies %K Teaching %K world %X

Much existing literature in anthropology suggests that teaching is rare in non-Western societies, and that cultural transmission is mostly vertical (parent-to-offspring). However, applications of evolutionary theory to humans predict both teaching and non-vertical transmission of culturally learned skills, behaviors, and knowledge should be common cross-culturally. Here, we review this body of theory to derive predictions about when teaching and non-vertical transmission should be adaptive, and thus more likely to be observed empirically. Using three interviews conducted with rural Fijian populations, we find that parents are more likely to teach than are other kin types, high-skill and highly valued domains are more likely to be taught, and oblique transmission is associated with high-skill domains, which are learned later in life. Finally, we conclude that the apparent conflict between theory and empirical evidence is due to a mismatch of theoretical hypotheses and empirical claims across disciplines, and we reconcile theory with the existing literature in light of our results.

%B Human Nature-an Interdisciplinary Biosocial Perspective %V 24 %P 351-374 %8 Dec %@ 1045-6767 %G English %N 4 %M ISI:000326446300001 %! Hum Nature-Int BiosHum Nature-Int Bios %0 Journal Article %J Human Nature %D 2012 %T Adaptive social learning strategies in temporally and spatially varying environments %A Nakahashi, Wataru %A Wakano, Joe Yuichiro %A Henrich, Joseph %B Human Nature %V 23 %P 386-418 %@ 1045-6767 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America %D 2012 %T Culture does account for variation in game behavior %A Henrich, J. %A Boyd, R. %A McElreath, R. %A Gurven, M. %A Richerson, P. J. %A Ensminger, J. %A Alvard, M. %A Barr, A. %A Barrett, C. %A Bolyanatz, A. %A Camerer, C. F. %A Cardenas, J. C. %A Fehr, E. %A Gintis, H. M. %A Gil-White, F. %A Gwako, E. L. %A Henrich, N. %A Hill, K. %A Lesorogol, C. %A Patton, J. Q. %A Marlowe, F. W. %A Tracer, D. P. %A Ziker, J. %K Punishment %B Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America %V 109 %P E32-E33 %8 Jan 10 %@ 0027-8424 %G eng %N 2 %M ISI:000298950200001 %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2012 %T Hunter-gatherer cooperation %A Henrich, J. %B Nature %V 481 %P 449-450 %8 Jan 26 %@ 0028-0836 %G English %N 7382 %M ISI:000299471800024 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2012 %T The ontogeny of human prosociality: behavioral experiments with children aged 3 to 8 %A House, B. R. %A Henrich, J. %A Brosnan, S. F. %A Silk, J. B. %K altruistic punishment %K children %K chimpanzees %K chimpanzees pan-troglodytes %K cooperation %K development %K evolution %K Fairness %K Food %K national-park %K prosocial behavior %K unrelated group members %K wild chimpanzees %K young-children %X

Humans regularly engage in prosocial behavior that differs strikingly from that of even our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). In laboratory settings, chimpanzees are indifferent when given the opportunity to deliver valued rewards to conspecifics, while even very young human children have repeatedly been shown to behave prosocially. Although this broadly suggests that prosocial behavior in chimpanzees differs from that of young human children, the methods used in prior work with children have also differed from the methods used in studies of chimpanzees in potentially crucial ways. Here we test 92 pairs of 3-8-year-old children from urban American (Los Angeles, CA, USA) schools in a face-to-face task that closely parallels tasks used previously with chimpanzees. We found that children were more prosocial than chimpanzees have previously been in similar tasks, and our results suggest that this was driven more by a desire to provide benefits to others than a preference for egalitarian outcomes. We did not find consistent evidence that older children were more prosocial than younger children, implying that younger children behaved more prosocially in the current study than in previous studies in which participants were fully anonymous. These findings strongly suggest that humans are more prosocial than chimpanzees from an early age and that anonymity influences children's prosocial behavior, particularly at the youngest ages. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

%B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 33 %P 291-308 %8 Jul %@ 1090-5138 %G English %N 4 %M ISI:000305863200006 %! Evol Hum Behav %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Science %D 2012 %T Outsourcing punishment to God: beliefs in divine control reduce earthly punishment %A Laurin, K. %A Shariff, A. F. %A Henrich, J. %A Kay, A. C. %K altruistic punishment %K Behavior %K cooperation %K cultural evolution %K evolution %K Fairness %K MARKETS %K people %K public-goods %K Punishment %K Religion %K support %X

The sanctioning of norm-transgressors is a necessary-though often costly-task for maintaining a well-functioning society. Prior to effective and reliable secular institutions for punishment, large-scale societies depended on individuals engaging in 'altruistic punishment'-bearing the costs of punishment individually, for the benefit of society. Evolutionary approaches to religion suggest that beliefs in powerful, moralizing Gods, who can distribute rewards and punishments, emerged as a way to augment earthly punishment in large societies that could not effectively monitor norm violations. In five studies, we investigate whether such beliefs in God can replace people's motivation to engage in altruistic punishment, and their support for state-sponsored punishment. Results show that, although religiosity generally predicts higher levels of punishment, the specific belief in powerful, intervening Gods reduces altruistic punishment and support for state-sponsored punishment. Moreover, these effects are specifically owing to differences in people's perceptions that humans are responsible for punishing wrongdoers.

%B Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Science %V 279 %P 3272-3281 %8 Aug 22 %@ 0962-8452 %G English %N 1741 %M ISI:000306335300021 %! P Roy Soc B-Biol Sci %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2012 %T Prestige-biased cultural learning: bystander's differential attention to potential models influences children's learning %A Chudek, M. %A Heller, S. %A Birch, S. %A Henrich, J. %K children %K Cognition %K conformist transmission %K credibility %K evolution %K ignorant %K infants %K Learning %K nonverbal cues %K prestige bias %K reliability %K selective imitation %K sensitivity %K social information %X

Reasoning about the evolution of our species' capacity for cumulative cultural learning has led culture gene coevolutionary (CGC) theorists to predict that humans should possess several learning biases which robustly enhance the fitness of cultural learners. Meanwhile, developmental psychologists have begun using experimental procedures to probe the learning biases that young children actually possess - a methodology ripe for testing CGC. Here we report the first direct tests in children of CGC's prediction of prestige bias, a tendency to learn from individuals to whom others have preferentially attended, learned or deferred. Our first study showed that the odds of 3- and 4-year-old children learning from an adult model to whom bystanders had previously preferentially attended for 10 seconds (the prestigious model) were over twice those of their learning from a model whom bystanders ignored. Moreover, this effect appears domain-sensitive: in Study 2 when bystanders preferentially observed a prestigious model using artifacts, she was learned from more often on subsequent artifact-use tasks (odds almost five times greater) but not on food-preference tasks, while the reverse was true of a model who received preferential bystander attention while expressing food preferences. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

%B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 33 %P 46-56 %8 Jan %@ 1090-5138 %G English %N 1 %M ISI:000298456100007 %! Evol Hum Behav %0 Journal Article %J Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %D 2012 %T The puzzle of monogamous marriage %A Henrich, Joseph %A Boyd, Robert %A Peter J Richerson %B Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %V 367 %P 657-669 %@ 0962-8436 %G eng %U https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2011.0290 %N 1589 %0 Web Page %D 2012 %T Too late: models of cultural evolution and group selection have already proved useful %A Henrich, Joseph %E Steven Pinker %B Edge: The False Allure of Group Selection %V 2015 %G eng %U https://www.edge.org/conversation/steven_pinker-the-false-allure-of-group-selection %0 Journal Article %J Cliodynamics %D 2012 %T Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action Problems %A Richerson, Peter J. %A Henrich, Joseph %B Cliodynamics %V 3 %P 38-80 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2012 %T Understanding the research program %A Henrich, J. %A Chudek, M. %K altruistic punishment %K behavioral-experiments %K cooperation %K defectors %K evolution %K perspective %K small-scale societies %X

The target article misunderstands the research program it criticizes. The work of Boyd, Richerson, Fehr, Gintis, Bowles and their collaborators has long included the theoretical and empirical study of models both with and without diffuse costly punishment. In triaging the situation, we aim to (1) clarify the theoretical landscape, (2) highlight key points of agreement, and (3) suggest a more productive line of debate.

%B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 35 %P 29-30 %8 Feb %@ 0140-525X %G English %N 1 %M ISI:000300708200017 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences %D 2011 %T The cultural niche: Why social learning is essential for human adaptation %A Boyd, Robert %A Peter J Richerson %A Henrich, Joseph %B Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences %V 108 %P 10918-10925 %@ 0027-8424 %G eng %N 26 %0 Journal Article %J Religion %D 2011 %T The cultural transmission of faith: Why innate intuitions are necessary, but insufficient, to explain religious belief %A Gervais, Will M %A Willard, Aiyana K %A Norenzayan, Ara %A Henrich, Joseph %B Religion %V 41 %P 389-410 %@ 0048-721X %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology %D 2011 %T Cultural Variations in Children's Mirror Self-Recognition %A Broesch, Tanya Lynn %A Callaghan, Tara %A Henrich, Joseph %A Murphy, Christine %A Rochat, Philippe %X

Western children first show signs of mirror self-recognition (MSR) from 18 to 24 months of age, the benchmark index of emerging self-concept. Such signs include self-oriented behaviors while looking at the mirror to touch or remove a mark surreptitiously placed on the child’s face. The authors attempted to replicate this finding across cultures using a simplified version of the classic “mark test.” In Experiment 1, Kenyan children (N = 82, 18 to 72 months old) display a pronounced absence of spontaneous self-oriented behaviors toward the mark. In Experiment 2, the authors tested children in Fiji, Saint Lucia, Grenada, and Peru (N = 133, 36 to 55 months old), as well as children from urban United States and rural Canada. As expected from existing reports, a majority of the Canadian and American children demonstrate spontaneous self-oriented behaviors toward the mark. However, markedly fewer children from the non-Western rural sites demonstrate such behaviors. These results suggest that there are profound cross-cultural differences in the meaning of the MSR test, questioning the validity of the mark test as a universal index of self-concept in children’s development.

%B Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology %V 42 %P 1019-1031 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J Trends in cognitive sciences %D 2011 %T Culture–gene coevolution, norm-psychology and the emergence of human prosociality %A Chudek, Maciej %A Henrich, Joseph %B Trends in cognitive sciences %V 15 %P 218-226 %@ 1364-6613 %G eng %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %D 2011 %T On the nature of cultural transmission networks: evidence from Fijian villages for adaptive learning biases %A Henrich, Joseph %A Broesch, James %B Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %V 366 %P 1139-1148 %@ 0962-8436 %G eng %U http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/audiofiles/Henrich%20Royal%20Society%20talk.mp3 %N 1567 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology %D 2011 %T Rapid cultural adaptation can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation %A Boyd, R. %A Richerson, P. J. %A Henrich, J. %K Altruism %K altruistic punishment %K behaviors %K conformist transmission %K cooperation %K Culture %K dynamics %K emergence %K Environment %K group selection %K norms %K population %K strategies %X

Over the past several decades, we have argued that cultural evolution can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation because it often leads to more rapid adaptation than genetic evolution, and, when multiple stable equilibria exist, rapid adaptation leads to variation among groups. Recently, Lehmann, Feldman, and colleagues have published several papers questioning this argument. They analyze models showing that cultural evolution can actually reduce the range of conditions under which cooperation can evolve and interpret these models as indicating that we were wrong to conclude that culture facilitated the evolution of human cooperation. In the main, their models assume that rates of cultural adaption are not strong enough compared to migration to maintain persistent variation among groups when payoffs create multiple stable equilibria. We show that Lehmann et al. reach different conclusions because they have made different assumptions. We argue that the assumptions that underlie our models are more consistent with the empirical data on large-scale cultural variation in humans than those of Lehmann et al., and thus, our models provide a more plausible account of the cultural evolution of human cooperation in large groups.

%B Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology %V 65 %P 431-444 %8 Mar %@ 0340-5443 %G English %N 3 %M ISI:000287320900003 %! Behav Ecol Sociobiol %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2010 %T Beyond WEIRD: Towards a Broad-based Behavioral Science %A Henrich, J. %A Heine, S. J. %A Norenzayan, A. %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 33 %P 111-135 %G eng %N 2-3 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %D 2010 %T The evolution of cultural adaptations: Fijian food taboos protect against dangerous marine toxins %A Henrich, Joseph %A Henrich, Natalie %B Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %V 277 %P 3715-3724 %@ 0962-8452 %G eng %N 1701 %0 Journal Article %J Biological Theory %D 2010 %T The Evolution of Religion: How Cognitive By-Products, Adaptive Learning Heuristics, Ritual Displays, and Group Competition Generate Deep Commitments to Prosocial Religions %A Atran, S. %A Henrich, J. %B Biological Theory %V 5 %P 1-13 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Cognition %D 2010 %T Gaze Allocation in a Dynamic Social Situation of Social Status and Speaking %A Foulsham, Thomas %A Cheng, Joey %A Tracy, Jessica %A Henrich, Joseph %A Kingstone, Alan %B Cognition %V 117 %P 319-331 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences %D 2010 %T Gene-culture coevolution in the age of genomics %A Richerson, P. J. %A Boyd, R. %A Henrich, J. %X

The use of socially learned information (culture) is central to human adaptations. We investigate the hypothesis that the process of cultural evolution has played an active, leading role in the evolution of genes. Culture normally evolves more rapidly than genes, creating novel environments that expose genes to new selective pressures. Many human genes that have been shown to be under recent or current selection are changing as a result of new environments created by cultural innovations. Some changed in response to the development of agricultural subsistence systems in the Early and Middle Holocene. Alleles coding for adaptations to diets rich in plant starch (e.g., amylase copy number) and to epidemic diseases evolved as human populations expanded (e.g., sickle cell and deficiency alleles that provide protection against malaria). Large-scale scans using patterns of linkage disequilibrium to detect recent selection suggest that many more genes evolved in response to agriculture. Genetic change in response to the novel social environment of contemporary modern societies is also likely to be occurring. The functional effects of most of the alleles under selection during the last 10,000 years are currently unknown. Also unknown is the role of paleoenvironmental change in regulating the tempo of hominin evolution. Although the full extent of culture-driven gene-culture coevolution is thus far unknown for the deeper history of the human lineage, theory and some evidence suggest that such effects were profound. Genomic methods promise to have a major impact on our understanding of gene-culture coevolution over the span of hominin evolutionary history.

%B Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences %V 107 %P 8985-8992 %8 May 11, 2010 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Science %D 2010 %T Markets, religion, community size and the evolution of fairness and punishment %A Henrich, J. %A Ensminger, J. %A McElreath, R. %A Barr, A. %A Barrett, C. %A Bolyanatz, A. %A Cardenas, J. C. %A Gurven, M. %A Gwako, E. %A Henrich, N. %A Lesorogol, C. %A Marlowe, F. %A Tracer, D. P. %A Ziker, J. %B Science %V 327 %P 1480-1484 %G eng %U http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/audiofiles/Markets,%20religion,%20community%20size%20and%20the%20evolution%20of%20fariness%20and%20punishment%20-%20audio.mp3 %N 5972 %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2010 %T Most people are not WEIRD %A Henrich, J. %A Heine, S. J. %A Norenzayan, A. %B Nature %V 466 %P 29-29 %8 Jul 1 %@ 0028-0836 %G English %N 7302 %M ISI:000279343800019 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2010 %T Pride, personality, and the evolutionary foundations of human social status %A Cheng, Joey T %A Tracy, Jessica L %A Henrich, Joseph %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 31 %P 334-347 %@ 1090-5138 %G eng %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2010 %T The weirdest people in the world? %A Henrich, Joseph %A Heine, Steven J %A Norenzayan, Ara %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 33 %P 61-83 %@ 1469-1825 %G eng %U http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/audiofiles/WEIRD1.mp3 %N 2-3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Cognition and Culture %D 2010 %T The Zeus Problem:Why Representational Content Biases Cannot Explain Faith in Gods %A Gervais, W. %A Henrich, J. %B Journal of Cognition and Culture %V 10 %P 383-389 %G eng %N 3-4 %0 Book Section %B Evolution, Culture and the Human Mind %D 2009 %T The Birth of High Gods: How the cultural evolution of supernatural policing agents influenced the emgerence of complex, cooperative human societies, paving the way for civilization %A Shariff, A. %A Norenzayan, A. %A Henrich, J. %E Schaller, Mark %E Norenzayan, Ara %E Heine, Steve %E Yamaguishi, Toshi %E Kameda, Tatsuya %B Evolution, Culture and the Human Mind %I Lawrence Erlbaum Associates %P 119-136 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Animal Cognition %D 2009 %T Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) do not develop contingent reciprocity in an experimental task %A Brosnan, S. F. %A Silk, J. B. %A Henrich, J. %A Mareno, M. C. %A Lambeth, S. P. %A Schapiro, S. J. %K Altruism %K Behavior %K capuchin monkeys %K chimpanzee %K cooperation %K evolution %K food transfer %K national-park %K other-regarding behavior %K Pan troglodytes %K prosocial behavior %K Reciprocity %K saguinus-oedipus %K unrelated group members %K wild chimpanzees %X

Chimpanzees provide help to unrelated individuals in a broad range of situations. The pattern of helping within pairs suggests that contingent reciprocity may have been an important mechanism in the evolution of altruism in chimpanzees. However, correlational analyses of the cumulative pattern of interactions over time do not demonstrate that helping is contingent upon previous acts of altruism, as required by the theory of reciprocal altruism. Experimental studies provide a controlled approach to examine the importance of contingency in helping interactions. In this study, we evaluated whether chimpanzees would be more likely to provide food to a social partner from their home group if their partner had previously provided food for them. The chimpanzees manipulated a barpull apparatus in which actors could deliver rewards either to themselves and their partners or only to themselves. Our findings indicate that the chimpanzees' responses were not consistently influenced by the behavior of their partners in previous rounds. Only one of the 11 dyads that we tested demonstrated positive reciprocity. We conclude that contingent reciprocity does not spontaneously arise in experimental settings, despite the fact that patterns of behavior in the field indicate that individuals cooperate preferentially with reciprocating partners.

%B Animal Cognition %V 12 %P 587-597 %8 Jul %@ 1435-9448 %G English %N 4 %M ISI:000267205800005 %! Anim Cogn %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences %D 2009 %T Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation %A O'Gorman, R. %A Henrich, J. %A Van Vugt, M. %K Altruism %K altruistic punishment %K cooperation %K costly punishment %K enforcement %K evolutionary origins %K followership %K free riding %K indirect reciprocity %K leadership %K provision %K Punishment %K societies %K Transmission %X

Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically.

%B Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences %V 276 %P 323-329 %8 Jan 22 %@ 0962-8452 %G English %N 1655 %M ISI:000262005200017 %! P R Soc B %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 2009 %T The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion: Credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution %A Henrich, Joseph %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 30 %P 244-260 %@ 1090-5138 %G eng %N 4 %0 Book Section %B Innovation in Cultural Systems: Contributions in Evolution Anthropology %D 2009 %T The Evolution of Innovation-Enhancing Institutions %A Henrich, J. %E Shennan, Stephen J. %E O'Brien, Michael J. %B Innovation in Cultural Systems: Contributions in Evolution Anthropology %I MIT %C Cambridge %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin %D 2008 %T Mirrors in the head: Cultural variation in objective self-awareness %A Heine, S %A Takemoto, T %A Moskalenk, S %A Lasaleta, J %A Henrich, J %B Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin %V 34 %P 879-887 %G eng %U https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167208316921 %N 7 %0 Journal Article %J Animal Behaviour %D 2008 %T Chimpanzees do not take advantage of very low cost opportunities to deliver food to unrelated group members %A Vonk, J. %A Brosnan, S. F. %A Silk, J. B. %A Henrich, J. %A Richardson, A. S. %A Lambeth, S. P. %A Schapiro, S. J. %A Povinelli, D. J. %K Altruism %K chimpanzee %K cooperation %K Empathy %K evolution %K mind %K other-regarding preference %K Pan troglodytes %K prosocial behaviour %K task %K tolerance %X

We conducted experiments on two populations of chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, to determine whether they would take advantage of opportunities to provide food rewards to familiar group members at little cost to themselves. In both of the experiments described here, chimpanzees were able to deliver identical rewards to themselves and to other members of their social groups. We compared the chimpanzees' behaviour when they were paired with another chimpanzee and when they were alone. If chimpanzees are motivated to provide benefits to others, they are expected to consistently deliver rewards to others and to distinguish between the partner-present and partner-absent conditions. Results from both experiments indicate that our subjects were largely indifferent to the benefits they could provide to others. They were less likely to provide rewards to potential recipients as the experiment progressed, and all but one of the 18 subjects were as likely to deliver rewards to an empty enclosure as to an enclosure housing another chimpanzee. These results, in conjunction with similar results obtained in previous experiments, suggest that chimpanzees are not motivated by prosocial sentiments to provide food rewards to other group members. The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

%B Animal Behaviour %V 75 %P 1757-1770 %8 May %@ 0003-3472 %G English %N 5 %M ISI:000255838700017 %! Anim Behav %0 Book Section %B Explaining Culture Scientifically %D 2008 %T A cultural species %A Henrich, J. %E Brown, Melissa %B Explaining Culture Scientifically %I University of Washington Press %C Seattle %P 184-210 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Current Anthropology %D 2008 %T Division of labor, economic specialization, and the evolution of social stratification %A Henrich, Joseph %A Boyd, Robert %B Current Anthropology %V 49 %P 715-724 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Human Nature %D 2008 %T Five misunderstandings about cultural evolution %A Henrich, Joseph %A Boyd, Robert %A Peter J Richerson %B Human Nature %V 19 %P 119-137 %@ 1045-6767 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %D 2008 %T More ‘altruistic’ punishment in larger societies %A Marlowe, F. %A Berbesque, J. C. %A Barr, A. %A Barrett, C. %A Bolyanatz, A. %A Cardenas, J. C. %A Ensminger, J. %A Gurven, M. %A Gwako, E. %A Henrich, J. %A Henrich, N. %A Lesorogol, C. %A McElreath, R. %A Tracer, D. %X

If individuals will cooperate with cooperators, and punish non-cooperators even at a cost to themselves, then this strong reciprocity could minimize the cheating that undermines cooperation. Based upon numerous economic experiments, some have proposed that human cooperation is explained by strong reciprocity and norm enforcement. Second-party punishment is when you punish someone who defected on you; third-party punishment is when you punish someone who defected on someone else. Third-party punishment is an effective way to enforce the norms of strong reciprocity and promote cooperation. Here we present new results that expand on a previous report from a large cross-cultural project. This project has already shown that there is considerable cross-cultural variation in punishment and cooperation. Here we test the hypothesis that population size (and complexity) predicts the level of third-party punishment. Our results show that people in larger, more complex societies engage in significantly more third-party punishment than people in small-scale societies.

%B Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences %V 275 %P 587-590 %G eng %N 1634 %0 Journal Article %J Social Justice Research %D 2008 %T Strong reciprocity and the roots of human morality %A Gintis, H. %A Henrich, J. %A Bowles, S. %A Boyd, R. %A Fehr, E. %K Altruism %K behaviors %K coevolution %K cooperation %K enforcement %K EUSOCIALITY %K evolution %K human nature %K morality %K norms %K populations %K Punishment %K Reciprocity %K selection %K sociobiology %X

Human morality is a key evolutionary adaptation on which human social behavior has been based since the Pleistocene era. Ethical behavior is constitutive of human nature, we argue, and human morality is as important an adaptation as human cognition and speech. Ethical behavior, we assert, need not be a means toward personal gain. Because of our nature as moral beings, humans take pleasure in acting ethically and are pained when acting unethically. From an evolutionary viewpoint, we argue that ethical behavior was fitness-enhancing in the years marking the emergence of Homo sapiens because human groups with many altruists fared better than groups of selfish individuals, and the fitness losses sustained by altruists were more than compensated by the superior performance of the groups in which they congregated.

%B Social Justice Research %V 21 %P 241-253 %8 Jun %@ 0885-7466 %G English %N 2 %9 Article %M ISI:000259071400008 %! Soc. Justice Res.Soc. Justice Res. %0 Book Section %B Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology %D 2007 %T Dual Inheritance Theory: The Evolution of Human Cultural Capacities and Cultural Evolution %A Henrich, J. %A McElreath, R. %E Dunbar, Robin %E Barrett, Louise %B Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology %I Oxford University Press %C Oxford %P 555-570 %G eng %0 Book Section %B The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology %D 2007 %T Modelling cultural evolution %A McElreath, R. %A Henrich. J. %E Dunbar, R.I.M. %E Barrett, Louise %B The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology %I Oxford University Press %C Oxford %P 571-585 %G eng %0 Book %D 2007 %T Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation %A Henrich, N. %A Henrich, J. %X

Why Humans Cooperate takes a unique look at the evolution of human cooperation and tries to answer the question: why are people willing to help others at a cost to themselves? The book brings together evolutionary theories, economic experiments, and an anthropological case study that runs throughout the book to explain and illustrate human cooperation.

Using an evolutionary framework, Natalie and Joseph Henrich have expanded upon several diverse theories for explaining cooperative or ‘helpful’ behavior, and integrated them into a unified theory. Established concepts such as kin selection and reciprocity have been linked with theories on social learning and our evolved psychologies to explain the universality of human cooperation—as well as the distinctive ways in which cooperative behavior expresses itself in different cultures.

The theories developed in the book are brought to life by examining the Chaldeans of metropolitan Detroit. By exploring Chaldean cooperation, theoretical concepts are shown to translate into social behavior, and universal psychologies for cooperation lead to culturally-specific norms, beliefs, and practices. The book also introduces a series of economic experiments that help us understand why, when, and to what extent people are willing to help others. These experiments also highlight the variation in behaviors across cultural groups, even when all the groups rely on the same cognitive machinery and evolved psychologies. The merging of theory, experiments, and the Chaldean case study allows for an in-depth exploration of the origins and manifestations of cooperation.

%I Oxford University Press %C New York %G eng %U http://www.oupcanada.com/catalog/9780195314236.html %0 Journal Article %J Science %D 2006 %T Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions %A Henrich, J. %B Science %V 312 %P 60-61 %G eng %N 5770 %0 Journal Article %J Science %D 2006 %T Costly Punishment Across Human Societies %A Henrich, J. %A McElreath, R. %A Ensminger, J. %A Barr, A. %A Barrett, C. %A Bolyanatz, A. %A Cardenas, J. C. %A Gurven, M. %A Gwako, E. %A Henrich, N. %A Lesorogol, C. %A Marlowe, F. %A Tracer, D. %A Ziker, J. %B Science %V 312 %P 1767-1770 %G eng %N 5781 %0 Journal Article %J Cognitive Systems Research %D 2006 %T Culture, evolution and the puzzle of human cooperation %A Henrich, J. %A Henrich, N. %K altruistic punishment %K conformist transmission %K cooperation %K cultural transmission %K culture-gene coevolution %K dual inheritance theory %K ethnicity %K group selection %K indirect reciprocity %K kin selection %K maya lowlands %K norms %K Punishment %K Reciprocity %K repeated prisoners-dilemma %K reputation %K resemblance %K sizable groups %K strategies %X

Synthesizing existing work from diverse disciplines, this paper introduces a culture-gene coevolutionary approach to human behavior and psychology, and applies it to the evolution of cooperation. After a general discussion of cooperation in humans, this paper summarizes Dual Inheritance Theory and shows how cultural transmission can be brought under the Darwinian umbrella in order to analyze how culture and genes coevolve and jointly influence human behavior and psychology. We then present a generally applicable mathematical characterization of the problem of cooperation. From a Dual Inheritance perspective, we review and discuss work on kinship, reciprocity, reputation, social norms, and ethnicity, and their application to solving the problem of cooperation. (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier B.V.

%B Cognitive Systems Research %V 7 %P 220-245 %8 Jun %@ 1389-0417 %G English %N 2 %M ISI:000242626300010 %! Cogn Syst Res %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Theoretical Biology %D 2006 %T Friendship, Cliquishness, and the Emergence of Cooperation %A Hruschka, D. %A Henrich, J. %B Journal of Theoretical Biology %V 239 %P 1-15 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Philosophical Psychology %D 2006 %T Susceptibility to the Muller-Lyer Illusion, Theory-Neutral Observation, and the Diachronic Penetrability of the Visual Input System %A McCauley, R. %A Henrich, J. %B Philosophical Psychology %V 19 %P 79-101 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J American Antiquity %D 2006 %T Understanding Cultural Evolutionary Models: A Reply to Read's Critique %A Henrich, J. %B American Antiquity %V 71 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2005 %T Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of unrelated group members %A Silk, Joan B. %A Brosnan, Sarah F. %A Vonk, Jennifer %A Henrich, Joseph %A Povinelli, Daniel J. %A Richardson, Amanda S. %A Lambeth, Susan P. %A Mascaro, Jenny %A Shapiro, Steven J. %B Nature %V 437 %P 1357-1359 %G eng %N 7063 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2005 %T "Economic man" in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies %A Henrich, J. %A Boyd, R. %A Bowles, S. %A Camerer, C. %A Fehr, E. %A Gintis, H. %A McElreath, R. %A Alvard, M. %A Barr, A. %A Ensminger, J. %A Henrich, N. S. %A Hill, K. %A Gil-White, F. %A Gurven, M. %A Marlowe, F. W. %A Patton, J. Q. %A Tracer, D. %K Altruism %K childrens imitative altruism %K cooperation %K cross-cultural research %K experimental economics %K Game Theory %K neural basis %K preferences %K public goods game %K public-goods experiments %K Punishment %K self-interest %K social dilemmas %K tolerated theft %K ultimatum game %K vicarious reinforcement %X

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments front around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the University students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model - based on self-interest - fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life.

%B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 28 %P 795-855 %8 Dec %@ 0140-525X %G English %N 6 %M ISI:000234696400022 %0 Journal Article %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %D 2005 %T Models of decision-making and the coevolution of social preferences %A Henrich, J. %A Boyd, R. %A Bowles, S. %A Camerer, C. %A Fehr, E. %A Gintis, H. %A McElreath, R. %A Alvard, M. %A Barr, A. %A Ensminger, J. %A Henrich, N. S. %A Hill, K. %A Gil-White, F. %A Gurven, M. %A Marlowe, F. W. %A Patton, J. Q. %A Tracer, D. %K Altruism %K evolution %K Fairness %K human cooperation %K indirect reciprocity %K norms %K public-goods experiments %K Punishment %K sizable groups %K ultimatum game %X

We would like to thank the commentators for their generous comments, valuable insights and helpful suggestions. We begin this response by discussing the selfishness axiom and the importance of the preferences, beliefs, and constraints framework as away of modeling some of the proximate influences on human behavior. Next, we broaden the discussion to ultimate-level (that is evolutionary) explanations, where we review and clarify gene-culture coevolutionary theory, and then tackle the possibility that evolutionary approaches that exclude culture might be sufficient to explain the data. Finally, we consider various methodological and epistemological concerns expressed by our commentators.

%B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 28 %P 838-855 %8 Dec %@ 0140-525X %G English %N 6 %M ISI:000234696400047 %0 Book Section %B Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies %D 2004 %T Comparative experimental evidence from Machiguenga, Mapuche, and American Populations %A Henrich, J. %A Smith, N. %E Henrich, Joseph %E Boyd, Robert %E Samuel Bowles %E Gintis, Herbert %E Ernst Fehr %E Colin Camerer %B Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies %I Oxford University Press %C Oxford %P 125-167 %G eng %F 2860 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization %D 2004 %T Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation %A Henrich, Joseph %B Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization %V 53 %P 85-88 %@ 0167-2681 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J American Antiquity %D 2004 %T Demography and cultural evolution: how adaptive cultural processes can produce maladaptive losses: the Tasmanian case %A Henrich, Joseph %B American Antiquity %V 69 %P 197-214 %@ 0002-7316 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book %D 2004 %T Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies %A Henrich, J. %A Boyd, R. %A Bowles, S. %A Camerer, C. %A Fehr, E. %A Gintis, H. %X

Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus. Literally hundreds of experiments suggest that people care not only about their own material payoffs, but they also care about such things as fairness and reciprocity. However, this research left a fundamental question remain unanswered: Are these non-selfish motives a stable aspect of human nature; or, are they substantially modulated economic, social and cultural environments? Prior to this book, the available experimental research could not begin to address this question because virtually all subjects had been university students, and while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small compared to the full range of human social and cultural environments. While a vast amount of ethnographic and historical research suggests that people's motives are influenced by the economic, social, and cultural environments, such methods,can only yield circumstantial evidence about human motives. As the longstanding disagreements within the cultural and historical disciplines attest, many different models of human action are consistent with the ethnographic and historical record.

In both testing the universally of previous findings, and in bridging the mythical chasm between ethnographic and experimental approaches, this volume deploys some of the principle experiments (which have been used to show non-selfish motives in university students) in combination with ethnographic data to explore the motives that underlie the diversity of human sociality. Twelve experienced field researchers performed the same experiments in fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. Our results can be summarized in five points: first, there is no society in which experimental behavior is consistent with the canonical model of rational self-interest; second there is much more variation between groups than has been previously reported; third, differences between societies in market integration and the importance of cooperation explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation between groups; fourth, individual-level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior within or across groups; fifth, experimental play often mirrors patterns of interaction found everyday life.

%I Oxford University Press %C New York %G eng %U http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199262045.do %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2004 %T Inequity Aversion in Capuchins? %A Henrich, J. %B Nature %V 428 %P 139 %G eng %N 6979 %0 Book Section %B Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies %D 2004 %T Overview and Synthesis %A Henrich, J. %A Boyd, R. %A Samuel Bowles %A Camerer, C. %A Fehr, E. %A Gintis, H. %A McElreath, Richard %E Henrich, J. %E Boyd, R. %E Samuel Bowles %E Camerer, C. %E Fehr, E. %E Gintis, H. %B Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies %I Oxford University Press %C New York %G eng %0 Book Section %B Genetic and Culture Evolution of Cooperation %D 2003 %T The Cultural Evolution of Cooperation %A Richerson, P. J. %A Boyd, R. %A Henrich, J. %E Hammerstein, Peter %B Genetic and Culture Evolution of Cooperation %I MIT Press %C Cambridge %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews %D 2003 %T The evolution of cultural evolution %A Henrich, Joseph %A McElreath, Richard %B Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews %V 12 %P 123-135 %@ 1520-6505 %G eng %N 3 %0 Book Section %B Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation %D 2003 %T Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaption? %A Fehr, E. %A Henrich, J. %E Hammerstein, Peter %B Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation %I MIT Press %C Cambridge %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Current Anthropology %D 2002 %T Are Peasants Risk-Averse Decision Makers? %A Henrich, J. %A McElreath, R. %B Current Anthropology %V 43 %P 172-181 %8 2002 %G eng %N 1 %F 4950 %0 Book Section %B Theory in Economic Anthropology %D 2002 %T Decision-making, cultural transmission and adaptation in economic anthropology %A Henrich, J. %E Ensminger, Jean %B Theory in Economic Anthropology %I AltaMira Press %C Walnut Creek, CA %P 251-295 %G eng %F 3570 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Cognition and Culture %D 2002 %T On Modeling Cultural Evolution: Why replicators are not necessary for cultural evolution %A Henrich, J. %A Boyd, R. %B Journal of Cognition and Culture %V 2 %P 87-112 %G eng %N 2 %F 7220 %0 Journal Article %J Current Anthropology %D 2002 %T Reply to kuznar's comment on our "Are Peasants Risk Averse Decision-Makers" %A Henrich, J. %A McElreath, R. %B Current Anthropology %V 43 %P 788-789 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Anthropologist %D 2001 %T Cultural transmission and the diffusion of innovations: Adoption dynamics indicate that biased cultural transmission is the predominate force in behavioral change %A Henrich, Joseph %B American Anthropologist %V 103 %P 992-1013 %@ 1548-1433 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and human behavior %D 2001 %T The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission %A Henrich, Joseph %A Gil-White, Francisco J %B Evolution and human behavior %V 22 %P 165-196 %@ 1090-5138 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2001 %T In search of Homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies %A Henrich, J. %A Boyd, R. %A Bowles, S. %A Camerer, C. %A Fehr, E. %A Gintis, H. %A McElreath, R. %B American Economic Review %V 91 %P 73-78 %8 May %@ 0002-8282 %G English %N 2 %M ISI:000169114600015 %0 Journal Article %J Current Anthropology %D 2001 %T On Risk Preferences and Curvilinear Utility Curves %A Henrich, J. %B Current Anthropology %V 42 %P 711-713 %G eng %N 5 %F 7200 %0 Book Section %B Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox %D 2001 %T What Is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality? %A Henrich, J. %A Albers, Wulf %A Boyd, Robert %A McCabe, Kevin %A Gigerenzer, Gerd %A Young, H. Peyton %A Axel Ockenfels %E Gigerenzer, Gerd %E Selten, Reinhard %B Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox %I MIT Press %C Cambridge, MA %P 343-359 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Theoretical Biology %D 2001 %T Why People Punish Defectors: Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas %A Henrich, J. %A Boyd, R. %B Journal of Theoretical Biology %V 208 %P 79-89 %G eng %N 1 %F 7120 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2000 %T Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior: Ultimatum Game Bargaining Among the Machiguenga %A Henrich, J. %B American Economic Review %V 90 %P 973-980 %G eng %N 4 %F 2850 %0 Journal Article %J Evolution and Human Behavior %D 1998 %T The evolution of conformist transmission and the emergence of between-group differences %A Henrich, Joseph %A Boyd, Robert %B Evolution and Human Behavior %V 19 %P 215-241 %@ 1090-5138 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Human Ecology %D 1997 %T Market Incorporation, Agricultural Change and Sustainability Among the Machiguenga Indians of the Peruvian Amazon. %A Henrich, Joseph %B Human Ecology %V 25 %P 319-51 %G eng %N 2